There is a hidden tension underlying current debates on issues such as liberalism, communitarianism, multiculturalism or nationalism in the field of political theory.¹ This hidden tension is at least as problematic as the tensions expressed by other, more explicit binary codes, such as community/individual, monism/pluralism or universalism/particularism. In this chapter, I will argue that the Reason/Emotion dichotomy, a foundational dichotomy or more precisely a dualism, originating in a partial and radical interpretation of Enlightenment thought, lies as an undisputed assumption behind those other binary codes, hindering the very possibility of arriving at new developments in the theory of democracy and of politics itself. The Reason/Emotion dichotomy induces with the “blissful clarity” of myth – using Barthes’ expression – an undisputed and omnipresent hyper-rationality. In turn, this has very negative de-politicizing effects on a large part of the arguments advanced by political theorists. In this respect it is revealing that egalitarian liberalism is built on the notions of rational/reasonable and public reason/non-public reason. Furthermore, the creation of community networks is usually presented as a kind of escape from moral subjectivism by appealing to a presumptive objective rationality of tradition. Moreover, it is striking that demands for representation of individuals or social groups are normally defended by resorting to an individual or group interest. Also, deliberation is based on the ideas of ‘rational consensus’ and ‘force of the

¹ Translated from the Spanish by Marcos Engelken-Jorge en Livérbula s.l., under the supervision of the author. This chapter is part of the project SEJ2007-67482: The Quality of Public Deliberation in Contemporary Democracies.
better argument’. Nationalism is regarded as morally justifiable only if it adopts the reasonable form of ‘civic patriotism’ within the alleged cultural neutrality of the State. Last but not least, it is also revealing that some feminist theories are controversially constructed in opposition to the aforementioned aspects by appealing to the notion of ‘Eros’, with an aim to freeing the repressed political dimension of affect. In my view, all these aspects show clearly the foundational marginalization, if not the theoretical exclusion, of emotion, passion, and feeling. Moreover, one crucial aspect of the problem in this chapter is the modern conceptual displacement of the classical notion of ‘passion’, which includes both affective and cognitive elements, by that of ‘emotion’ conceived as the other of Reason (Dixon 2003; Oatley 2004). In the following pages, however, I will be using these terms, i.e. emotion, passion and feeling, as synonyms, to refer to the structurally-banned affective dimension of politics.

In close relation to the aforementioned uncritical and – as I argue here – untenable dualism, reason and emotion are concepts that have built each other reciprocally, I would say in a sort of bi-univocal correspondence, by means of a long process of overdetermination which has produced a semantic matrix of conceptual associations and oppositions. As a result, both concepts have eventually come to be thought as belonging to two mutually-exclusive and self-evident horizons of meaning – to put it in the words of Kosellek. Only within this antagonistic horizon of interpretation and reception (reason vs. emotion) do both notions begin to make sense in theoretical discourse.

The list of classic readings that have helped modern authors define the notion of liberty has been biased favouring a very specific and reductive notion of reason which is clearly opposed to that of emotion. Other possible theoretical resources, from Spinoza to Fergusson and Tocqueville via Hume, have been misinterpreted or simply dismissed. In short, politics has been conceived of theoretically as pertaining to the realm of the rational, i.e. as an achievement of reason. Indeed, the State itself, when thought of as the monopoliser of political power and legitimate violence, is justified by its unbeatable capacity to domesticate passions: “Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.” (Hamilton The Federalist Papers 15). The idea of reasoning person who is isolated and loosed from any affective bond with fellow citizens; the tenet that emotion distorts, clouds or disturbs reason, and that it should be kept under control so as to achieve a rational reasonability, which constitutes the basis of modern politics; the reduction of rationality to a form of calculus, free from any contaminating affect, metaphor or interpretative frame (racionciatio est computatio) and its reduction to the principle of self-interest maximization; the design of institutions as a combination of various mechanisms of aggrega-
tion and intermediation of interests, of checks and balances and other sorts of filters aimed at ‘cooling’ the passions, or at deactivating them to ‘calm passions’ which are ultimately reducible to the discourse of interests, so as to exclude emotion from the public sphere, are a few of the diverse arguments variously formulated and combined, and with different scope, by authors as varied as Descartes, Weber, Kant, Stuart Mill, rational choice theorists, Rawls or Habermas.

As pointed out by George Lakoff, from said perspective, coming to dominate politics by the end of the 20th century, you will be inclined to “think that all you need to do is give people the facts and the figures, and they will reach the right conclusion. You will think that all you need to do is point out where their interests lie, and they will act politically to maximize them. (...) You will not have any need to appeal to emotion – indeed, to do so would be wrong! You will not have to speak of values; facts and figures will suffice.” (Lakoff 2008: 11)

However, the reason/passion dichotomy, whose subtle and nuanced contestation by Aristotle and the Hellenistic thinking had sank into oblivion, has been subjected for over 20 years to renewed critical scrutiny by authors working within the disciplines of neuroscience, philosophy, psychology, sociology and the epistemology of the social sciences, more radically than ever before, exploring new paths and multiple ranges (Marcus et al. 2000; Neuman et al. 2007; Castells 2009). However, this untenable and misleading dichotomy still governs the dominant paradigms that inform empirical and normative research in the fields of political science and political theory – precisely, those disciplines that are supposed to deal with the bios politikos and the vita activa. Moreover, this happens although political scientists and social psychologists are well aware of the presence of emotional appeals in electoral campaigns, as well as of the relevance of emotional factors (e.g. fear or enthusiasm) for understanding electoral behaviour and the outcome of political campaigns (Brader 2006; Westen 2007) – let alone other more extreme phenomena such as religious, ethnic or nationalist violence.

The aim of this chapter is to provide arguments to criticize the above mentioned misleading dualism present in the fields of political theory (and political science). This dualism is responsible for an unacceptable narrowing of the political. This is because the reason/passion dichotomy is a key premise of an underlying theoretical logic in which: 1) The foundational exclusion of emotion leads to an unfeigned hyperrationality that, 2) leads to the overvaluation of consensus and the correlative negation of deep conflict as an inescapable dimension of politics. 3) Processes of collective identity construction and mobilization are
neglected, hand in hand with rational individualism, and 4) a displacement is promoted of politics by morality, law or economy.

Towards said aim, first, I will explain how the reason/emotion dichotomy is semiotically structured, by using a complex semantic chain of significations (1). Then, I will show that this dichotomy has a decisive influence on the chief paradigms of contemporary political theory by overburdening the notion of reason and excluding passion (2). Third, I will introduce some of the most important contributions appearing in diverse disciplines and that are relevant for the questioning of several crucial aspects of the emotion/reason dualism in politics (3). Finally, I will discuss new theoretical approaches within political philosophy that have clearly surpassed the old analytical frame and that are in the origin of a non-dichotomic conceptual horizon that is crucial for the normative thinking of democracy (4). It should be stated from the outset that my argumentation does not intend to support a case for ‘more passion’ in politics. Rather, it aims at providing the basis for a new way of articulating reason and emotion in the vita activa. More precisely, the focus is on a new way rooted in contemporary wisdom that transcends a reduction of the political to morality, law and the analysis of public policies and public management.

The Semiotic Structure of the Reason / Passion Dichotomy

The dichotomy between reason and passion has been constructed by the gradual superposition of various sets of binary codes, homologies and semantic antagonisms. These have generated an hegemonic narrative of political discourse that clearly assigns a positive value on reason, while presenting different dimensions of emotion as the negative antithesis of reason. This symbolic structure of associations and oppositions underlies in the form of an ideal type beneath the notion of political reason coined by the moderns. However, the notion has been given several meanings depending on case and empirical development. A summary can be found in table 1, of the most common and persistent chains of equivalences and oppositions upon which the reason/emotion dualism has been based (according to the classic division between matter and spirit established by Christian Wolff in Psychologia Rationalis 1734 §34). Based on this dualism, emotion, feeling and passion have been excluded from the conceptual-cum-semantic field giving rise to the conception of modern politics as the empire of reason. The argument is very briefly provided below.

The opposition between reason and emotion was formulated by Descartes as a radical division between spirit and matter, mind and body, res cogitans and res extensa, i.e. between an indivisible and non-measurable thinking ‘thing’
(res) and a mechanical and infinitely divisible non-thinking body. In this way, an undisputed assumption was born that still perdures; namely, “the suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgement, and the suffering that comes from physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from the body.” (Damasio 1994: 320) This point of departure is characterized by a normatively-biased division between an upper sphere (that of the mind, the spirit…) and an inferior sphere (related to body, to the sheer biological dimension, to “visceral factors”, in the words of William James) – summing up, by a divide between “head” and “heart” (Koziak 2000: 153). From said point of departure, an hyperrationalist notion of cold reason has been postulated, in which thought (i.e. reasoning) opposes feeling by separating the cognitive from affective elements, i.e. by separating self-controlled from automatized elements (Spezio and Adolphs 2007: 74).

In this way, the idea that a pure, objective, consensual, non-contradictory and dispassionate form of knowledge is possible is substantiated. The idea is conceived of as having the sole ownership of all the cognitive, evaluative and motivational components of the human soul. From this viewpoint, passions are depicted as the completely other of the brightness of reason. Indeed, they are thought of as unpredictable and having an irrational, unconscious, innate (i.e. not learnt), obscure, suspicious, conflictive and contradictory origin. Moreover, their etymology shows that they have been conceived as opposed to the principle of the vita activa; namely, as characterized by passivity. They are regarded as something that happens to us, which befalls us in an unforeseeable manner, depriving us of self-control and enslaving us (for instance, we are ‘overwhelmed’ or ‘roused’ by passion). Within this framework, emotions are thought of as irrational forces that hinder action, i.e. that create heteronomy, and are alien to our true selves, that is, to our conscious selves (cogito ergo sum). Moral and political actions are conceived of as the conscious and rational prosecution of the goals set by a self-determined person (sapere aude). Hence, passion is thought of as something threatening, external to our thinking selves; something disturbing and blinding, clouding judgement and agitating the mind, making it sectarian, partisan and unpredictable, overwhelming and alienating us. Thus, passions are often metaphorically equated to natural disasters: passions are stormy or torrential, eruptive… In short, they disturb the Apollonian and Satur-nian harmony of reason, science, wisdom and moral and political righteous judgement (James 1997: 13). From this perspective, emotions are seen as subjective forces that hamper self-control and reasonability, bring us back into the obscure world of prejudice, superstition and dependency. In short, emotions make us return to, in the words of Kant, “self-imposed immaturity” (selbstver-schuldeten Unmündigkeit). In contrast, reason is equalled to science and objec-
tive knowledge by authors of the Enlightenment, and thus, is thought of as speaking a universal language, one associated to Light (Enlightenment, Siglo de las Luces, Iluminismo, Lumières, Aufklärung), in opposition to the subjective partiality of passions, from the “dark night” of Romanticism (Reddy 2001: 211) – if we were to understand this period of history, probably exaggerating some of its features, as a total and traditionalistic rejection not only of modernity but also of science and reason.

Since the work of Madison, Kant or Sieyès, the consequences of the passion/reason division for the creation of a free political order are clear: passions trigger sectarianism, subjectivity; they hinder the achievement of impersonal and objective agreements, of consensus, as well as the genuine negotiation of the common interest and the common good. Thus, the intrusion of affects, as well as of personal and expressive factors in the public realm is conceived not only as something that perturbs the use of public reason but also as something potentially authoritarian and despotic (Rosenblum 1987: 167). Civilization – or even Culture, if it is imagined in a universalistic fashion, i.e. as heading toward progress and truth – is supposed to dominate, channel and tame passions, for emotion brings us back to our animal condition; in short, to nature. Therefore, modern politics are conceived theoretically as an artificial realm, i.e. as the realm of social contract allowing us to abandon the state of nature, in which hope and fear are the dominant passions (homo homini lupus). Moreover, reason facilitates entering the realm of institutional design, i.e. the design of sophisticated mechanisms intended to calm political passions (for instance, the writing of a Constitution, the separation of powers, bicameralism, the creation of a system of checks and balances, et cetera) (Holmes 1995). In this regard, Sieyès, who analysed politics as though they were an “ordinary machine”, designed “machines” and “rouages”, and thus felt the imperious need for abandoning the rhetoric of emotions, the “language of sentiment” and the “language of affect”, in order to defend that politics are used in the “abstract” terms of science, judgement and principles (Maiz 2007: 81). In summary, in the context of the aforementioned dualism, emotion is thought of ultimately as the completely other of political reason; that is to say, as a sort of atavism or primitive remainder, as a symbol of everything that has been left behind by civilization and progress, and that has no proper place in the enlightened realm of liberty created by the moderns.

Now, this discourse of rationalist foundation of politics descends a step further in its materialist secularization; is reformulated in instrumental terms, losing in this way most of its normative and moral content, which would have led to the provision of principles (Sprangens 1981). This discourse takes shape as a less philosophical and more empirical concept. The concept of interest is
discrete, can be operationalized and measured, and abandons excessively abstract and inefficient notions related to the metaphysics of morals, moral philosophy, or ethical and political principles. Even the notion of motives understood as *convictions* is brushed away by the new concept (Walzer 2004: 123). This is the key functionality of the concept of *interest*. It provides a common language and a common measuring rod, it facilitates the use of rationality and calculation, and it furnishes us with an idea of the Good facilitating communication in the public sphere of market society. Indeed, interest can be clearly expressed (‘interest will not lie’), and is furthermore undeniably individual (‘each person is the best judge of his interests’). On the other hand, it allows to bridge the gap to legitimate decision-making; to the generation of majorities by mechanisms of preference aggregation (decision-making rules, parliaments, political parties, and so forth). It should be noted that this process has three distinct components: 1) the substitution of principles (convictions, moral reasons), which should provide the moral basis of institutions, by the notion of *interest*, which is better attuned to negotiation (Hirschman 1977: 2). 2) The translation of some types of passions to the language of interest (for instance, the pursuit of profit or other *calm passions*, associated to *le doux commerce*). 3) The concomitant exclusion of other more indomitable passions from the realm of politics (e.g. indignation or compassion), and their confinement to private life. In short, the notion of *interest* does not only imply the exclusion of passions from the political sphere but also the debilitation of ethical and political principles, and their substitution by a utilitarian feeble notion of the Good that is allegedly shared by everybody and is the rationalist maximization of individual interest.

This reductionistic notion of reason underlies the image of the modern individual as a singular citizen furnished with interests and individual rights, in opposition to collective or group identities and to amorphous *masses* driven by irrational loyalties or the passionate identification – *Einfühlung, Empathy* (Morrell 2010) – of the self not only with another person but with the whole group. Moreover, it is this notion of reason at the heart of modern citizenship that has enabled us to imagine a type of nationalism, or better said *civic patriotism*, that has structured the relations, i.e. rights and duties, between citizens and the State; the only notion providing the foundations of a type of political Constitution that is indeed conceived as a shelter against passion (*precommitment*). This type of patriotism is therefore totally different to ‘ethnic nationalism’, or even to nationalism *tout court*. In fact, from this perspective ‘nationalism’ is held to be invariably influenced by an organic link between nature and passion and creates a holistic totality in which individual reason disappears. Thus, it is a patriotism that elevates liberalism above populism, which is related to collective passions and to charismatic (thus, non-rational) leadership.
In this way, politics is imagined as a rationalized realm of order, stability and coherence, but also as the realm of work and legitimate power exercised by the rational machinery of the State (interest aggregation, majority rule); that is, a realm that is thought of as constituting the other side of the domination of scientific reason over nature. Within this reason/passion dualism, passion is always conceived of as the problem, while reason appears as the only possible solution. Because passions are debilitating, generate dependencies, unpredictability, partiality and subjectiveness, they ought to be confined to individual privacy and excluded from citizenship, i.e. from the public sphere.

Table 1: The Reason/Emotion Dichotomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Emotion</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mind</td>
<td>Body</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Res cogitans</td>
<td>Res extensa</td>
<td>Civilization</td>
<td>Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thought</td>
<td>Feeling</td>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>Affective</td>
<td>Modern</td>
<td>Primitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Heart</td>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>Passions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Subjective</td>
<td>Calculus</td>
<td>Impulse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>Irrational</td>
<td>Negotiable</td>
<td>Unnegotiable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvinism</td>
<td>Pietism</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Mass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscious</td>
<td>Unconscious</td>
<td>Civility</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>Metaphoric</td>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Populism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Automatism</td>
<td>Liberty</td>
<td>Tyranny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement</td>
<td>Prejudice</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>Coherence</td>
<td>Incoherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucidity</td>
<td>Obfuscation</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanity</td>
<td>Insanity</td>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Sensuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructive</td>
<td>Destructive</td>
<td>Apollonian</td>
<td>Dionysian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality</td>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Weakness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Arbitrariness</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlightenment</td>
<td>Romanticism</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Last but not least, this privatization of passion is also placed in the feminine realm, that is, the realm of passivity, irrationality, weakness and ultimately, privacy. Reason is a primarily ‘masculine’ capacity to take action, to make decisions, to master self-control, to exercise dominion and to govern the public sphere achieved through personal and institutional harnessing and exclusion of emotions (Hall 2005: 36). Thus, women have managed to open a space for themselves in the public sphere by entering unambiguously into the signification chain and behaviours fitting this hyperrationalist vision of politics, in other words, by assuming all the features that are supposed to be related to reason – at
the price, however, of being under suspicion of acting against ‘their nature’, in a cold and manly fashion.

**Hyperrationality and the Theoretical Exclusion of Emotion in Mainstream Political Theory**

In this section, I will tackle succinctly this foundational exclusion of emotion and passion in four influential strands of modern political theory: utilitarianism, Marxism, (post-)Kantian liberalism (Rawls) and communitarianism (MacIntyre). To do so, I will consider four figures that illustrate the ideal-typical arguments advanced by these theories. However, it should be stated from the outset that these ideal-typical arguments necessarily simplify both the complex arguments advanced by each of the authors considered and, in particular, the complexity and inner plurality of each of the aforementioned theories. Nevertheless, they will help to demonstrate that an unthought space underlies those theories, that is to say, a space that appears in the form of an undisputed assumption, i.e. a theoretical non-place that is the non-place of passion and affect.

Let us consider first **utilitarianism** (Figure 1). It advances a consequentialist argument; namely, it provides a criterion for assessing norms and actions that rests upon the evaluation of the consequences derived from these actions and norms, not upon their accordance to ethical and political principles. What matters is whether actions and norms lead to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people (Goodin 1995). Utilitarianism departs from an allegedly realistic image of the individual, i.e. it does not presume altruism or perfect information in decision-making but a materialist type of ‘rationality’, that is, one that is based upon the notion of **interest**, as well as on the idea that interests are given and revealed. This secularized perspective assumes, then, a notion of the **Good** that is not linked to moral, metaphysical or religious principles. In contrast, individual happiness is taken to be the mere **utility maximization** of individual interests. At this point, a crucial problem arises; namely, how are we to cross the gap that separates, on the one hand, the initial scenario of a group of **individuals**, who are separated by their conflicting interests, from the expected scenario of a well-ordered **society**, characterized by legitimate decision-making. The answer provided by utilitarianism is clear: through mechanisms of aggregation that, with minimal processing, allow the grouping and the selection among various sets of compatible and transitive scales of individual preference. The common good is, thus, conceived as the maximization of the sum of individual utilities. On the basis of this conception, principles of justice are inferred, which are to govern the aggregation of individual preferences by public institutions.
By this mechanism, the pursuit of each person’s self-interest should lead to collective happiness. At this point, two aspects of this basic utilitarian argument should be highlighted: 1) A classic notion of reason, characterized by having a substantive ethical and political content (principles and convictions), is displaced by another one that is more instrumental and that rests upon the notion of interest. 2) The idea of the Good is theoretically purged of any content departing from the principle of utility maximization. What is excluded, in particular, is the consideration of civic virtues and the emotions that reinforce those virtues, being both virtues and emotions necessary motivational and normative components of a well-functioning democracy.

Figure 1: Utilitarianism

In Marxism’s classic paradigm (cf. figure 2 – major corrections by Gramsci, Althusser or Marx himself are not included), the point of departure is a theory of history built on a materialist philosophy (historical materialism) focusing on the economic infrastructure of society; namely, on the relationships of production (Cohen 1978). In this context, the productive forces, which are taken to be the key explanatory factor, are conceived as related to the relations of production. In other words, it is claimed that the relations of production have changed through history – namely, are specific for each mode of production (Asiatic, feudal, capitalist) –, managing in this way to increase the human capacity of production. Moreover, they are held to group individuals into social classes. The concept of social class, in turn, rests upon the notion of class interest, which refers to collective shared interests. Finally, according to Marxism’s classic argument, legal and ideological superstructures adapt to the relations of production so as to promote the development of the productive forces. Assuming these premises, Marxism argues 1) that in the capitalist society, the proletariat is the overwhelmingly majoritarian social class, owing to the process of proletarianization of the middle classes, and 2) that the interests of the proletar-
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iat are increasingly universal, i.e. increasingly widespread, objective and transparent. This is due to the growing exploitation and impoverishment of the great majority, which owes to the inherent dynamics of capitalism, as well as to processes of urban and industrial concentration. 3) This causes class consciousness, which is thought of as the awareness of the objective interests shared by the working class, to become more consistent and to prevail over other differences of religion, nation, culture, etcetera. 4) Since class antagonism rests upon economic determinations, it is held to inevitably lead to a radical change, which is conceived of as a social revolution (leading to changes in the mode of production), not as a mere political one (which would have an effect solely on the superstructure). 5) Finally, the aspiration of achieving equality, i.e. of satisfying the interests of the proletariat in a classless, free of injustice and exploitation-free society, prevails over liberty (associated to superstructure rights). Liberty thus becomes dispensable and the State adopts authoritarian forms such as the dictatorship of the proletariat. In this manner, a scientific analysis of reality (historical materialism), which eliminates the need for a merely normative, philosophical, political or moral analysis, uncovers the hidden rationality that lies behind commodity fetishism, as well as the tendencies and inner contradictions of capitalism, highlighting the authentic interests of the workers.

Figure 2: Marxism

In short, 1) the censure of the “poverty” of moral and political philosophy, linked to 2) the need for a social revolution, which pursues equality – not simply political, i.e. formal, change – and 3) fulfils the objective class interests of the proletariat. Thus, it can be argued that notions like scientific reason, universalism, economic class interest and so on, which are essential to Marxism, emerge within an objectivist and hyperrationalist account of social change. This account, moreover, disregards the complex group of mechanisms at work in a
process of collective action, in two ways: 1) it ignores the costs associated to processes of collective decision-making and mobilization, i.e. the resources invested, possible collateral effects, opportunity costs, et cetera, or 2) the unavoidable normative (i.e. convictions, principles: justice, equality, fraternity), as well as motivational components (i.e. political virtues and emotions, which are capable of activating convictions: solidarity, compassion, indignation and so on). As the later Cohen believed: “a change in the social ethos, a change in the sentiments and attitudes people sustain toward each other in the thick of daily life, is necessary for producing equality” (Cohen 2000 145).

Let us turn now to the post-Kantian version of Liberalism exemplified in the works of Rawls (cf. figure 3). Here, another, substantially different conception of reason is at play, different from the previous two. 1) The ethical and political impulse of the classic enlightened notion of reason is taken up again, and 2) a nuanced splitting of the concept of reason is postulated, into rationality, or the faculty of determining one’s own interests and conception of the Good, and reasonability, i.e. the capacity to arrive at cooperative agreements in order to form the basis of democratic institutions. On the one hand, the exercise of moral autonomy, that is to say, of individual rationality, generates an incommensurable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the Good. On the other hand, by contrast, a neo-contractarian hypothesis argues that reasonability (i.e. political autonomy) is capable of generating an overlapping consensus shared by different conceptions of the Good that, in turn, found the principles of justice that should govern public institutions. Two arguments advanced by Rawls are decisive at this point: 1) The thesis that justice should prevail over the Good, in contrast to what utilitarians argue, and 2) the idea that conceptions of the Good should not belong to the realm of public reason but that of non-public reason, that is, to the private sphere. From this follows that “devotions and affections” (sic.), which are related to the “bonds of loyalty and fidelity” that are characteristic of conceptions of the Good, should be excluded from the principles of justice. In other words, passions and emotions that are associated to conceptions of the Good, even “the convictions and passions of the majority,” should remain excluded from the realm of politics (Rawls 1971: 373). The only exception allowed to this foundational exclusion is “moral sensitivity.” However, it should be noted that this exception has not been elaborated theoretically, although it contradicts the dominant rationalist paradigm of Rawls’ work. By taking into account “moral sensitivity,” which affects conceptions of the Good and conceptions of justice, “attitudes” – in fact, they are emotions, e.g. “sympathetic identification,” “sense of justice” or “love of mankind” – are allowed to enter into the public sphere, since they are taken to be both rational and reasonable. But what else can be “moral sensitivity” but a passion, an expres-
sion of ‘enthusiasm’ toward justice and cooperation or the desire for a well-ordered society? However, this hidden normative and motivational dimension of emotion is not adequately tackled within the theoretical territory of public reason expressed as the overlapping consensus on the principles of justice, nor behind the veil of ignorance of the original position. In short, there is a significant tension between the dominant rationalist (Kantian) paradigm and a subordinated almost Humean perspective in the work of Rawls. Although the latter standpoint is not theoretically articulated, it manages to re-introduce the unavoidable dimension of emotion and to place it at the very heart of the Apollonian political constructivism, at work in the deduction of the principles of justice.

**Figure 3: J. Rawls**

- **Political Constructivism**
  - Persons
    - Rational
    - Reasonable
    - Free
    - Equal
  - I. Political Autonomy
    - Social Contract
      - Original Position
      - Veil of Ignorance
    - Public Reason
  - II. Moral Autonomy
    - Preferences
      - 1st & 2nd Order
    - Citizenship

- **Justice as Fairness**
  - Overlapping Consensus
  - Principles of Justice
    - I. Equal Freedom: Basic Liberties
    - II. Difference: Primary Goods
  - Public Reason
  - Citizenship
  - State (Positive) Neutrality

- **Goodness as Rationality**
  - Reasonable Pluralism
    - Conceptions of the Good
      - Comprehensive Doctrines
      - Incommensurable Conflicts
  - Non-Public Reason
  - Privacy Civil Society

Finally, let us turn to another theory that could be expected to have a larger focus than the previous ones on the rational-cum-affective dimension of politics; namely, communitarianism, in its neo-Aristotelian version (MacIntyre 1981) (cf. figure 4). Mirroring the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality, communitarianism argues that the transition from a non-educated human nature to its telos, i.e. its inherent purpose or end, is mediated by certain virtues. According to the argument, they provide humans with the necessary moral dispositions to reach their telos. However, the genesis and development of these virtues is not a matter that depends solely on the individual person but also on
the *polis*, that is, the political community. Virtues will be unable to prosper in the absence of a favourable context. Thus, virtues will only prosper if there are public institutions promoting a shared conception of the good life, of the idea of Good, giving the coordinates of the shared *telos* of a life worth living. In this regard, it is the political community who provides the necessary moral resources to cultivate these virtues, and it does so through *customs* and *tradition* (articulated group of customs). For this reason, *paideia*, i.e. a system of instructions that should teach pupils the civic obligations of their *polis* and of citizenship, and *phronesis*, i.e. practical wisdom, are held to be the most basic activities for the cultivation of virtues. Therefore, morality, conceived as a rational and intelligible undertaking, is taken to be unable to exist outside a specific political community.

*Figure 4: MacIntyre*

Contrary to the subjectivist and individualistic conception of morality held by the liberals (autonomy), communitarianism advances an objective conception of morality (authenticity) that is based upon the notion of *community* and leads to regain impersonal and rational ethical standards of justification. It should be noted that this departs significantly from Aristotle’s, for who good politics depended on the ability to develop emotional dispositions in essential link with rational judgements about the good life. In this regard, what is lost in the rationalist and objectivist analysis of MacIntyre (1990), greatly influenced by neo-Thomism in this respect, is the Aristotelian notion of *thumos*, or the emotive
capacity (the Aristotelian equilibrium between indignation, fear, compassion and affect) to acquire and practice the civic virtues in the *polis*, the psyche's capacity for emotion that is then organized by virtues and the institutions. For Aristotle, the justification of the emotional and practical dispositions is based on the notion of *eudaimonia*, or capacity to flourish and cultivate the simultaneous exercise of emotional and rational capacities within an institutional context that promotes both of them. However, this articulation of emotion and reason is omitted from the argumentation of MacIntyre, who does not consider at all the Aristotelian notion of *civic passion*, i.e. the complex amalgam of beliefs, values, moral evaluations, physical sensations and communitarian narratives (Koziak 2000: 164). The omission of this dimension by MacIntyre has been to some extent corrected by other authors such as Sandel (1982) or Walzer (2004), also associated to communitarianism. These two authors have re-introduced the affective dimension into this theory, though in a very unsystematic fashion, in an attempt to correct the normative and motivational deficit of the rationalist idea of the good life advanced by MacIntyre.

**The Contemporary Critique of the Reason/Passion Dichotomy: From Neuroscience to Philosophy and the Social Sciences**

For over more than 20 years, research in neuroscience, psychology and other fields such as philosophy, epistemology of the social sciences or sociology, has been undermining the very basis of the traditional dichotomies between reason and passion, and mind and body. It has been shown that, first, hyperrationalist approaches, which have been usually uncritically assessed and overrated, are plagued with inconsistencies and other drawbacks (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 1992), as is the case, for instance, of neoclassical economy. Second, there is evidence that reflection is not free-standing but conditioned by *interpretative frames* (Lakoff 2008). Third, it has also been argued that it is the brain’s emotional system what explains why the mind functions by connecting emotion and cognition and by using interpretative frames (Trepel *et al.* 2005; Parrott 2001). Moreover, there is growing evidence that emotion is involved in reasoning. Indeed, it enhances rather than undermines reasoning, as was previously assumed (Evans 2001; Evans and Cruse 2004). Furthermore, emotion is nowadays considered capable of influencing decisively and in predictable ways political judgement, decision-making and information processing (Marcus *et al.* 2000; Cassino and Lodge 2007), as well as judgement and moral evaluation, as has been shown by contemporary neuroethics (Baertschi 2009; Evers 2009). On top of that, it has also been shown that human action is triggered by processes of
decision-making in which both emotion/sentiment and reason concur (Damasio 2003: 149).

There are two different emotional circuits, which are ruled by different neurotransmitters: The circuit of dopamine is associated to positive emotions (happiness, satisfaction, enthusiasm), while the circuit of norepinephrine is linked to negative emotions (fear, anxiety, anger). In this chapter, we shall focus on two aspects of this rich, multidisciplinary literature: 1) Emotion is the brain function that motivates, directs and prioritizes human behaviour. 2) Emotion and cognition interact in complex ways – the former one can either enhance or undermine the capacity of deliberation (Neuman et al. 2007: 15). Moreover, emotion provides subjects with the feeling that their goals and plans are somehow related to the broader context in which they take place. This is a crucial feeling, since in its absence decision-making would be deficient or even impossible. Indeed, “flat emotion and feeling” is related to “decision-making defect,” thus suggesting that “[t]he powers of reason and the experience of emotion decline together” (Damasio 1994: 54).

More precisely, emotions perform two functions that are crucial for politics: 1) They act as relevance detectors, i.e. they trigger the feed-back mechanism that determines the significance that internal and external stimuli have for the achievement of each person’s goals (Frijda 1986). Moreover, 2) emotions function as re-orientation mechanisms that prepare mind and body to respond adequately to new challenges and conditions (Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996).

In summary, emotions are no longer considered an impediment to the appropriate use of reason. On the contrary, they are regarded as one decisive precondition for its correct use (although, similarly to arguments, emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate). Furthermore, there is a great deal of research in psychology in the widest sense that has demonstrated experimentally the indissoluble connection between emotion and reason, and between sentiment and mood, and rationality (Zajonc 1980; Frank 1988; Mackie and Worth 1989; Cornelius 1996; Parrott 2001; Greco and Stenner 2008; Sluds 2009; Rifkin 2010).

Ronald de Sousa, Robert Solomon, Dylan Evans, Robert Frank, Antonio Damasio and J. LeDoux, and many others, have not only shown that the absence of emotion engenders irrational decisions – contrary to conventional wisdom – but also that it strongly hinders the capacity to take any decision at all. According to these authors, decision-making without its affective dimension would be deprived of its crucial ‘saving time devices’. It would thus take too long and end up being irrational. It is now finally established, against the inherited stereotype of abstract reason, that reason is “embodied reason, reason shaped by our bodies and brains and by the interaction with the real world, reason incorporating emotion, structured by frames and metaphors and images and symbols, with con-
scious thought shaped by the vast and invisible realm of neural circuitry not accessible to consciousness.” (Lakoff 2008: 14)

In parallel to neuroscience and psychology, philosophy initiated a current of substantive recovery of the theme of emotion both through new reinterpretations of classic works – Aristotle, Spinoza or Hume – or based on contemporary research advances in neuroscience and psychology. In my view, two authors – Solomon and De Sousa – are crucial to this new philosophical approach to passion; because of their significance to the field of political theory.

Robert Solomon, for instance, has advanced a complex argument that similarly to Nietzsche or Sartre has placed passion at the centre of human life; in particular, regarding the following two dimensions: 1) Intentionality: “All emotions are intentional, ultimately ‘about’ both ourselves and the world.” Emotions are defined by the very objects with which they deal; hence different emotions have different ontologies. This leads us to 2) evaluation: Value judgements constitute the crucial components of emotions (good or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust, gained or lost). Moreover, to the extent that emotions imply value judgements, they require standardized criteria for judging and attributing responsibilities. This, in turn, brings us to 3) action: Contrary to the etymology of emotion, which suggests that emotions are passive, i.e. they are something that simply occurs accidentally, overwhelming us, emotions are actions, they imply power, the capacity to do whatever we want and express in this way our emotions. This is why Solomon (1993: 222) contends (maybe in a too categorical and exaggerated manner) that “every emotion is a subjective strategy for the maximization of personal dignity and self-esteem.”

Ronald de Sousa, in turn, develops a philosophical analysis of emotional rationality in his well-known book The Rationality of Emotion. Briefly, he proposes an ideal of an “adequate emotional response.” His notion of emotional rationality implies a tragic image of life, which departs from the linear and reductionist hyper-rationality of certain enlightened authors. For de Sousa, the complex intentionality of emotions, which combine object-directedness with intentional and informative elements, provides the capacity for them to play a crucial role in rationality. They play this role, at least partly, by supplementing the formal rules that are usually taken to be crucial to the exercise of rationality. The absence of an “adequate emotional response” does not only undermine the rationality of decisions but hinder decision-making itself by deferring decisions. According to de Sousa, emotion contributes to rationality by reducing the amount of information to be considered, as well as by limiting possible interferences and the number of relevant options to be taken into account each time; that is to say, emotion supplements reason by complementing the deficiencies of the latter (de Sousa 1987: 195).
Summarizing some of the most relevant arguments advanced in this varied literature we can contend that:

1. Emotions have a cognitive dimension. Thus, it is not sensible to distinguish between emotion and knowledge, for the former contributes to the solution of problems that demand creativity, judgement and the adoption of decisions that require processing large amounts of information (Damasio 2003; LeDoux 1996).

2. Emotion and reason are both anchored to the body. Hence, it is not sound to maintain the mind/body dichotomy (Damasio 1994 and 2003).

3. Reason relies upon procedural memory and declarative memory and hence upon previous learning. In this regard, to the extent that emotions play a role in learning processes, reason is also emotion-dependent (Marcus 2002).

4. Reason relies on emotion to determine what is crucial and vital for us. In this respect, emotion determines which problems should be solved by reason and supplements it by limiting the number of possible alternatives. In other words, emotion combines an evaluative mental process with a dispositional response to this cognitive-cum-evaluative process (de Sousa 1987; Solomon 1993).

5. Reason depends on the emotional systems to trigger the actions that cannot be carried out by reason itself. Consequently, emotions are necessary to fill the gap between reason and conscious or unconscious action (Frijda 1986; Ben-Ze’ev 2000).

6. In turn, emotions are influenced by judgements (i.e. values and beliefs), since the former emerge once an object or event has been appraised in a particular situation. This constitutes a major difference between human and animal emotions (Nussbaum 2001; Elster 1999a).

7. Emotions have a cognitive dimension that is not only determined by certain genetic factors but is also in part socially constructed. That is to say, emotions are determined by cultural and socio-structural factors. Moreover, emotions are transmitted by processes of emotional socialization (Evans 2001; Turner and Stets 2005 and 2007; Barbalet 2001; Clarke et al. 2006).

In summary, emotion has four fundamental dimensions: cognitive (i.e. information about certain specific circumstances), evaluative (i.e. personal relevance attributed to this information), motivational (i.e. the disposition to act once this information has been evaluated) and sensitive (i.e. an objectless mood) (Ben-Ze’ev 2000).
Considering everything that has been advanced in this section, it is not surprising that various research programmes, usually influenced by social-psychology and neuroscience, have emerged since late 1970s in the field of sociology. In this regard, several books dealing with the role of emotion in social relations have been published since the 1980s (Flam 1998 and 2002; Turner and Stets 2005 and 2007).

Based on their detailed diagnosis of post-modernity, Michel Maffesoli and his research team at the Centre d’Étude sur l’Actuel et le Quotidien at the Université Paris Sorbonne have been highlighting for some time the affective dimension of contemporary “emotional communities,” as well as the decisive political role of emotional and sensible bonds, of the “emotional quotient,” of a “sensitive reason” and of the “ethics of aesthetics,” etcetera, arguing against the Cartesian hyperrationalist, contractarian and voluntaristic conception of politics advanced by the moderns. All these issues – i.e. the growing political mobilization of emotional energies and feelings of belonging, the mobilization of the human being “longing for roots,” the topic of the affective pacte societal and so on – have been ever-present in the work of Maffesoli from Le Temps des Tribus (1988) to Iconologies (2008) via La Transfiguration du Politique (1992) and Éloge de la Raison Sensible (1996).

For many sociologists, emotions can be regarded as the ‘glue’ of social bonds. They generate support for social and cultural structures and furthermore sustain the viability of the social and symbolic systems themselves. However, concurrently there will be occasions when emotion may estrange individuals from their cultures and societies, leading to challenges to their own cultural and social traditions. In this respect, emotions have been considered a vantage point for micro-sociological analysis, since they are considered a crucial link between the micro and the macro dimensions or, better said, between social systems and actual social action. Hence emotion has attracted the attention of many scholars working in different areas; just to mention a few, symbolic interactionism (Goffmann, Burke), the theory of “Interaction Ritual Chains” (Randall Collins), psychoanalytic symbolic interactionism (Turner), social exchange theory (Homans, Blau), macrostructural approaches (Barbalet) or postmodernism (Maffesoli) etc. (Turner and Stets 2005).

Recently, Castells has synthesized superbly the growing connection between neuroscience, psychology and sociology: “Feelings and the constitution of the self emerge in close relation, but only when the self is formed are emotions processed as feelings. By becoming known to the conscious self, feelings are able to manage social behaviour, and ultimately influence decision-making by linking feelings from the past and the present in order to anticipate the future
by activating the neural networks that associate feelings and events.” (Castells 2009: 197)

Nevertheless, Jon Elster’s work is perhaps the most outstanding example of all these attempts to incorporate emotion to social scientific analysis. In recent years, Elster has elaborated a theory of explanation in social science, from the starting point of rational choice theory. He advanced an original interpretation of Marx’s work, characterized by a methodological individualism at odds with Cohen’s functionalist interpretation. His epistemological account has then expanded gradually in scope, finally incorporating the mechanisms that mediate between cause and effect, and proposing a theoretical account based on an interactive articulation of the following three dimensions: (1) rational choice, (2) social norms and (3) emotions. In this way, Elster denies both “economic imperialism” and “cultural-studies imperialism,” for these accounts try to explain behaviour and decision-making by presenting them as results of rational choice processes, revised and amplified according to models of biological adaptation, or as social constructions that are infinitely malleable. Indeed, Elster has been increasingly critical with the hyperrationalist reductionism of many models of rational choice theory. In particular, he has censured the practice of attributing ‘objective interests’ to social actors, that is, allegedly ‘objective’ interests that are defined depending on the context. Such an account is problematic, according to Elster, because it fails to consider the role that other key factors (e.g. social norms or emotions) may play in a specific situation (Elster 2007: 463). Notwithstanding, he does acknowledge the importance of interests and material incentives, as well as the usefulness of expanded rational choice models and game theory, Elster contends that the interaction between emotion and interest is far more complex than admitted by cost/benefit models, given that emotions contribute to determine the preferences and rewards at stake.

Following Solomon in this respect, he suggests that emotions give sense to our lives, and thus they are decisive, i.e. “the stuff of life.” In other words, emotions constitute the most powerful bond capable of linking human beings together, we feel them intensely, and they can be highly pleasant or unpleasant. Indeed, many manifestations of human behaviour would be unintelligible, if we were not to take emotion into account (Elster 1999a: 486). In this regard, Elster contends that emotions are capable of influencing action in three different ways: 1) They constitute sources of happiness and unhappiness, pleasure and displeasure, as well as 2) impulses to action. 3) They manage to influence mental states and, in particular, beliefs.

According to this author, emotions have an undeniable cognitive dimension (in the broad sense, i.e. including moral beliefs), which allows 1) to differentiate human from animal passions, since animals are unable to develop com-
plex beliefs about their own emotions (there is no cognitive link between emotion and action). Furthermore, 2) emotions vary depending on the cultural and social environment, and in particular, depending on the dominant cognitive and moral principles (Elster 1999b: 21).

Besides, in Elster’s view some emotions are essentially social, in the sense that they are triggered by beliefs about other human beings, whilst others are just contingently social. The influence of the former ones upon human behaviour depends to a great extent on the social norms internalized by social agents (cf. figure 5). More precisely: “social norms in general operate through the emotions of shame and contempt.” (Elster 1999a: 140)

Figure 5: Elster

In the following, the main characteristics of emotion pointed out by Elster will be listed – at least those features that are relevant for the purpose of this chapter (Elster 1999a, 1999b and 2007). It should be noted that his thought in this respect has been greatly influenced by Frijda (1986), and that many of the arguments advanced by Elster overlap with those made by Ben-Ze’ev (2000). Plainly:

1) Cognitive antecedents: Emotions depend upon beliefs that we hold about ourselves and others. This is a feature that, in turn, is referred to the cultural context, which is understood as a set of shared values, beliefs and concepts. In this regard, Elster highlights three crucial aspects: a) Emotions support social norms by, for instance, inducing shame for not having accomplished a duty or scorning those who are unreliable. Furthermore, he argues b) that each culture has its own qualitative and quantitative repertoires of emotions, and finally, c) that
emotions that are integrated within the axiological repertoire of a specific culture are subjected to diverse social norms.

2) Observable physiological effects (such as changes in heart rate, body temperature, blood pressure, breathing pattern, or other, visible changes on the skin) and physical expressions (e.g. the posture assumed, the tone of voice, and other visible expressions such as shouting, smiling or crying).

3) Action tendencies: Emotions are actions, “states of readiness to execute a given kind of action” (Frijda 1986: 70), or better said, “modes of relational action readiness, either in the form of tendencies to establish, maintain or disrupt a relationship with the environment or in the form of mode of relational readiness as such” (Frijda 1986: 71). Furthermore, emotions do not only promote action in general, but more precisely, they promote the most immediate action possible.

4) Intentional objects: Emotions, unlike feelings, which are taken to be just an element (among others) of emotions, are always intentional, i.e. they are ‘about’ something: a person, an object or a situation.

5) The pleasure/pain valence which varies in intensity: Emotions can be pleasurable or painful. Action tends to achieve pleasure and to act on conditions generating displeasure.

Unlike disciplines such as neuroscience, psychology, sociology and epistemology of the social sciences, in which the conception of emotion has been cut loose from the classic reason/passion dichotomy for over 20 years, political analysis remains alien to “emotional rationality” (McDermott 2004: 702) and under the hegemony of hyperrationalist explicative models – notwithstanding that the concept of reason initially deployed by these hyperrationalist models has been revised and broadened (bounded rationality, framed rationality and so forth). Nevertheless, there is a belief that is gaining increasing acceptance; namely, that there might be certain emotional factors underlying the classic explicative variables (i.e. utility maximization, political opportunity structure, political culture, et cetera). Thus, this belief holds that these emotional factors might play a relevant role in explaining political phenomena, too. If we limit our considerations to the last decades, this belief can be traced back to Raymond Williams (1977), who coined the notion of “structures of feeling” to refer to the deeply rooted dispositions and sensibilities that, located beyond the realm of ideas and principles, are at the very basis of different modes of life. This concept, moreover, was taken up by researchers such as Hetherington (1998: 79) to account for the expressive dimension of political processes of identity construction. More recently, other authors have demonstrated, for instance, that emo-
The affective dimension of politics can be found in other phenomena such as electoral behaviour, which has normally been explained by resorting to hyperrationalist and mainly spatial analytical models based on the principle of utility maximization (rational voter), disregarding in this way other aspects such as emotion or discursive frames, which underlie the behaviour of the electorate, or are even required by the chain of thought prompted by the explicative hyperrationalist model itself (Nardulli and Kuklinsky 2007; Lupia and Menning 2007; Elster 2007; Lakoff 2008). However, the electorate is confronted in every electoral process with a plurality of alternatives, which are sorted out with the help of mechanisms such as the felt sympathy toward a political leader or a political party (apparently forgotten mechanisms, notwithstanding the work of Campbell 1960), which implies an “affective orientation.” More precisely, the electorate is to a large extent an “emotional constituency.” In fact, “people vote for the candidate who elicits the right feelings, not the candidate who presents the best arguments” (Westen 2007: 125). Research on affective intelligence has demonstrated that voters are influenced by emotions such as enthusiasm or anxiety. In this regard, it has been shown that enthusiasm lessens the amount of reflection and encourages resorting to pre-established heuristic devices, such as political identification, when deciding who to vote for (Marcus 2002; Cassino and Lodge 2007). Other studies have claimed that feelings of impotence or solitude, fostered by the secret ballot, are responsible for political apathy, low levels of political participation and political cynicism (Barbalet 2001), while Marcus (2002: 104) has shown that anxiety affects the political judgement of the voters. It has an influence on the quality of this judgement, on the effort to search for new information and on the voters’ processing capacity of this new information. In summary, 1) “the political brain is an emotional brain” (Western 2007); accordingly, 2) “the rational (…) voter is an emotional voter” (Brader 2006: 195); and as a corollary, 3) “emotion is both central and legitimate in political persuasion” (Lakoff 2008: 8).

The most relevant emotional systems play a visible role in many citizens’ and politicians’ activities, thus undermining the traditional image of cold, dispassionate reason, which has been normally thought of as independent, self-
sufficient and opposed to emotion. Emotional systems gather information from the environment, process it and produce sensations. This information, in turn, influences procedural as well as declarative memory. It also has effects on habits and learning processes, and precedes and prepares conscious activity. Following McDermott, an optimal – according to standard neuroscientific knowledge – decision making model must consider the multiple roles played by emotion: mobilization to action, calculation, future discounting, information gathering and selection, memory, historical analogies, risk perception etc. (McDermott 2004).

The emotional dimension becomes more evident if we consider one unavoidable feature of politics; namely, the processes of collective mobilization, as well as the conflicts for power among social groups. This implies both the construction of the group itself as a shared, protagonist social identity (an ‘us’) and the construction of a ‘them’, which acts as the antagonist. In turn, these two crucial activities of political action imply and articulate in complex manners and in one single movement the following elements: 1) material elements (interest); 2) ethical and political elements (principles, convictions, ideals); and 3) emotional elements (positive and negative affective bonds). Political action, be it cooperative or conflictive, consensus-oriented or dissenting, requires that political actors have the capacity to take heed to the intentions and goals of the actors with whom they interact. Contrary to what a well-known expression suggests – ‘it’s nothing personal, just politics’ – it has to be concluded that, strictly speaking, ‘the personal is political’, i.e. that politics is a personal experience that is guided by emotional perceptions. This is obvious in some extreme cases such as ethnic conflicts. For instance, Petersen has developed an “emotion based approach” that highlights the role played by passions such as hate, fear or resentment in these conflicts. According to this author, the former two emotions are not as relevant as the latter one, but resentment is shown to be decisive, since it connects structure to information; information to beliefs and emotions; and beliefs and emotions to political action and the repertoires of action (Petersen 2002).

However, not only in processes of political mobilization do (negative) passions play an important role but also in those of de-mobilization. In this regard, Helena Flam has analyzed systematically the crucial effects of fear on the protests that took place in the authoritarian regimes of East Germany and Poland before 1989 (Flam 1998). Based on over 100 in-depth interviews, she contended that fear was a crucial factor that brought those protests to a standstill and deteriorated the chances of overcoming the problems associated to collective action. And Cass Sunstein has provided a sophisticated discussion of the ambivalent
effects (action or inaction) of fear in risk-evaluation and decision-making processes in his systematic critique of the “precautionary principle” (Sunstein 2005).

It is not necessary though to look at antagonisms that are so emotion-laden. Regarding other more common cases, it can be claimed that it is crucial to connect a problem with an emotional reaction so as to achieve that citizens take deep care of that particular problem and act co-ordinately – since the rational understanding of a problem has been shown to be insufficient and in need of being supplemented by emotion. In other words, without this emotional connection, sheer rational comprehension does not lead to action. In short, emotional processes link together these three aspects: behaviour, memory and learning processes, which are crucial in politics to maintain a habit, defend a regime, change an attitude or an institutional pattern, or to challenge a political order. For example, Gamson has suggested that framing a situation as unjust, during a process of collective mobilization, cannot be seen as a sheer cognitive or intellectual judgement about what is just or unjust, but has to be regarded as an expression of moral indignation – as a “hot cognition,” to put it in social-psychological terms (Zajonc). From this follows that the more concrete both the goals of collective action and the problem that this action tries to correct and the more specific the antagonist (i.e. the social group held responsible for the problem under consideration), as well as the more colourful the terms used to describe this problem, the stronger the motivation of the participants and the more vivid the emotions felt by social actors, which reinforce the sense of indignation and thus enhance the probability and intensity of social mobilization (Gamson 1992: 32). In summary, passion plays a vital role in the political construction of collective identities and therefore in the unavoidable agonistic dimension of politics, which cannot be made to fit completely into a consensual and ‘rational and reasonable’ model of politics without eliminating the very essence of democratic politics (Mouffe 2002).

Actually, strategic and instrumental aspects of politics are intrinsically related to expressive elements, turning interests and principles inseparable from the underlying emotions. This is especially evident if we consider the political logic of collective action. Considering the inner dynamics of political parties, groups and movements, it can be argued that they generate, through their political action, collective identities that are capable of merging individuals into a common project, as well as capable of fostering solidarity bonds and feelings of belonging, which emerge not only from shared goals but also from shared memories and the idea of a common future. The emotional ties of these collective identities are, moreover, strengthened by participating in collective action and by the existence of an us/them opposition, i.e. a political antagonism. In this context, the emotional dimension of revolutions and political protests constitutes
a promising research strand, which can be regarded as supplementing traditional structural models and those based on resource mobilization theory, as well as culturalist approaches. This research strand will certainly highlight the role played by emotions (fear, hope, indignation, resentment) in this type of political processes, in which emotions may work as ‘mental frames’ or ‘action tendencies’ (Jasper 1997; Goodwin et al. 2000; Reed 2004; Flam and King 2005).

All these shared emotions, ideas and projects tend to crystallize forming networks of varying stability, which reproduce, in turn, the initial structures of meanings, emotions, cognitive praxes, memories and symbols. In this regard, it would be safe to use the expression ‘emotional scheme’ (analogously to Sewell’s “cultural schemes”) to refer to the set of emotional meanings and memories of shared sensations, as well as the repertoires of common or conflicting actions occurred during the interactions between participants, opponents and audiences.

Every process of identity construction requires a certain emotional transference that, though varying in intensity and duration, manages to promote the feeling that one belongs to a cause, a movement or a party, i.e. to something that transcends the individual, and thus that is charged with a certain amount of collective emotional energy. In this regard, frame analysis, for instance, which is still influenced by a limited notion of rationality, is marked by rationalism and cognitivism (Goodwin et al. 2000: 6). Surprisingly, emotions play a very limited role, or no role at all, in the constructivist explanation of collective action advanced by frame analysts, who were expected to more open and sensitive to the emotional dimension of politics than authors resorting to structural or rational-choice theory approaches. However, strictly speaking the normative-cum-cognitive framing of ‘reality’ must be accompanied by its emotional framing (Flam and King 2005: 24). In this respect, cognitive-linguists who analyse interpretative frames (Lakoff) are paying increasing attention to insights developed by researchers on political emotions (Westen), since both fields of research are complementary. Cognitive science and neuroscience have demonstrated that frames, metaphors and narratives are imprinted in the brain’s neural circuitry; that is to say, cultural models reside in our brains. It has also been shown that narratives are neurally articulated, i.e. physically wired in our brains – at least concerning their dramatic structure, the distribution of protagonist and antagonist roles, and their emotional structure, i.e. Damasio’s “somatic markers,” which link the dramatic structure with the double circuit of positive and negative emotions. Here is where this new understanding of the brain is relevant to the analysis of politics: established circuits of empathy and fear constitute the very bases of fundamental moral and ideological differences (Lakoff 2008: 103; Rifkin 2010).
Political parties, political leaders and social movements promote continually contending political programmes and images of society but also counter-emotions or even, on certain occasions, subversive counter emotions. We should insist that emotions can be as functional or dysfunctional for action as reasons and interests can be. For instance, emotions such as cynicism, fear or resignation are demobilizing, while indignation, empathy or fraternity can be highly mobilizing (Gamson 1992: 31).

Finally, the new “performative approach” should be also mentioned, that is, the analyses of “contentious performances” (Klandermans 2009) and “ritual performances” (Alexander 2006; Eyerman 2005). Klandermans, for example, considers classic instrumental and ideological variables in order to explain the motivation of individual agents who participate in demonstrations. But he also considers another factor disregarded by Tilly (2003), group anger, which plays also a crucial role, according to his argument. Eyerman claims that the narrative structures of cognitive frames appear within a wider rhetorical and emotional matrix from which they cannot be separated. In this way, according to his argument, a sense of continuity is provided, as well as connections to past references and to the future, shared emotional experiences are amplified, and so too is the collective significance of the event. Moral empathy, feelings of belonging, affective ties and bonds of solidarity are also some of the fundamental elements of the collective identities of social movements, social groups and political parties. These considerations lead to the conclusion that a broadened notion of discourse should be used in political analysis, i.e. one that refers to narratives consisting not only of words but also of protest repertoires, gestures and symbolically charged expressions (assemblies, demonstrations, celebrations, myths, flags, statues, emblems and so on). In summary, “performance theory adds a new dimension to the study of social movements in linking cognitive framing, narration and discourse with the practice of mobilization, and thus emotion” (Eyerman 2005: 49).

The Return of Passions to Political Theory

The aforementioned insights gained in the fields of neuroscience, social-psychology, epistemology of the social sciences and sociology have greatly influenced contemporary political theory. In this regard, they have forced it to revise its rationalistic axioms and to take up an argument that can be traced back to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, but that has been marginalized until recently by utilitarianism and rational choice theory.
It should be noted from the outset that: 1) the hyperrationalist approach to politics is a modern phenomenon. It has rested upon the displacement of the classical meaning of emotion by its modern meaning – i.e. the conception of emotion as unintentional, “visceral” and non-cognitive (Dixon 2003: 250) –, and upon a partial and restrictive interpretation of certain classic literature (Hobbes, Descartes, Hume, Madison and so on). This interpretation has been promoted mainly by utilitarianism and by the economic accounts of politics that prevailed during the last third of the 20th century. 2) This foundational exclusion of passion from political theory – in other words, the construction of politics as the unpolluted realm of reason – is but a normative project that has not been fully accomplished by any theoretical approach, neither a classic nor a contemporary one, not to mention politics itself (incidentally, in this respect this normative project is similar to many others, e.g. the exorbitant ambition to monopolize power associated to the notion of sovereignty.). The many reformulations of this normative project have always ended up showing inconsistencies, generating normative and motivational deficiencies that have even been acknowledged by the own authors of these reformulations. On occasion, authors have even revised, explicitly or implicitly, the rationalist logic underlying their accounts. In this regard, I shall remind the reader of Hobbes’ ambivalence not only toward fear (a concept that binds tightly together reason and emotion) but also toward ambition or desire for power, which can be, according to Hobbes, destructive or constructive. Moreover, these feelings are held to be even indispensable to the progression of knowledge and to happiness (James 1997). Even Kant, an authoritative reference of this rationalistic tradition, changed his point of view after his Third Critique – in particular, this change is evident in Kant’s Opus Postumum –, giving passions greater consideration at the expense of moral action and acknowledging their inevitable and productive character. In this way, Kant paved the way for the subsequent romantic conception of emotion (Kahn et al. 2006).

The Federalist Papers constitute another significant example. To be sure, they are the locus classicus of an approach preoccupied with restraining passions. This goal does not only characterize the conception of politics advanced by the Federalist Papers, but it also serves as the basis for justifying the conception of State developed in these manuscripts. Passions are supposed to be blind, unruly and dangerous forces that overburden politics, promote sectarian attitudes and hamper negotiation and compromise. Nonetheless, at the same time emotions are constantly reintroduced in the discourse and presented as positive, even necessary, elements of politics: They are thought of as a kind of “democratic energy” that fuels the entire system of checks and balances (Federalist
Paper n° 45), as public-spiritedness (n° 10 and 51), as “veneration” of the legitimate government (n° 49), et cetera.

The same holds true for many other classic texts of modern political theory. One of them is De l’Influence des Passions sur le Bonheur des Individus et des Nations by Germaine de Staël (1796), which is of great interest in this context, though has been largely disregarded in the literature. Still in the tradition of radical Enlightenment, a tradition that de Staël herself revised some years later, in the advent of the German romanticism, passion is conceived of as “the impulsive force that drives men with independence of their will” and as “the greatest difficulty of governments.” Furthermore, this conception is accompanied by the chimeric and rationalistic hope of “imagining that political science might someday acquire geometric evidence” (Staël 1796: 61). However, though Madame de Staël introduces the notion of interest as an explicit alternative to emotion, she also acknowledges, though without further elaboration, that “there is something grand in passion,” that “the love for study has all the characteristics of a passion,” and finally that “the veneration of the republic is, in its pure form, the highest feeling that a man can conceive” (Staël 1796: 67).

Many examples can be given, though it is compulsory to focus, in particular, on an author who has played a crucial role in establishing the modern hyper-rationalist canon of politics; namely, Max Weber. In his classic work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, more precisely in his discussion of Pietism, Weber, who is influenced in this respect by Descartes and Kant, introduces first the culture/nature dualism, which then gives rise to the (more radical) reason/passion dichotomy. The German sociologist regards passions as irrational forces, i.e. impulses that disturb reason and the self-control that is necessary for modern life and modern forms of work. In his much famous critical analysis of Pietism, he censures the “greater emphasis of Pietism on the emotional side of religion,” as well as its “weakening of the inhibitions which protect the rational personality.” In this regard, Weber opposes Pietism to Calvinism, whose greater rationality and aversion to the emotional side of religion, i.e. “the anti-rational, emotional elements” (Weber 1920: 165), foster the worldly asceticism that triggers, in turn, progress of the capitalist civilization. Nonetheless, as has been shown by classic (Mitzman 1971) and contemporary (Barbalet 2008) studies, there is a conspicuous move of Weber’s thought “away from the initial unqualified celebration of ascetic rationalism.” His personal experiences and maturity drew him to a different perspective on reason and passion, and Weber finally acknowledged in his discussion of the notion of Beruf the undeniable importance of emotion for social action. He finally assumed “that emotions cannot be eliminated from human affairs and they also have a positive role in clarifying intentions and ordering action” (Barbalet 2008: 69).
Something very similar happens with contemporary political theorists. We have seen already that Rawls ended up reintroducing a secondary paradigm in his work, notwithstanding his arguments on reason and reasonableness, public reason and non-public reason, though without being systematic or revising the original rationalistic paradigm. This secondary paradigm articulates without prior notice “thought and feeling” (Rawls 1971: 587), and it is expressed by notions such as “moral sensitivity,” “sense of justice,” “moral feelings” et cetera. The same holds true for Habermas and his reflections on the “ideal speech situation” and “the public sphere.” In order to achieve a purer proceduralism than Rawls, but also a more deliberative theory of democracy, Habermas tries to purge all normative content from the procedures of justification advanced by his theory. By doing so he attempts to maintain the principles of justice free from any (ethical) idea of the Good, which would be inevitably partial. This implies – as Habermas himself acknowledges – a “motivational deficit,” which owes to the fact that moral rationality in Habermas’ account tends to disregard, by differentiating too strictly between morality and conceptions of the good life, the affective bonds and desires that usually induce action. But then again, emotions reappear, though in an unsystematic manner, in Habermas’ argumentation of the need for solidarity and empathy in real-world deliberation. Although Habermas’ thought is potentiality well-suited to integrate passion, since his theory of communicative action does not rest upon semantics but on the pragmatics of speech-acts, said reintroduction of emotion remains under-theorized in his work. A similar argument can be advanced regarding the exaggerated emphasis that Habermas places on consensus in his initial account. Accordingly, he disregards the role played by passion in political confrontations between conflicting collective projects and identities, which constitutes the very essence of the political (Mouffe 2000). Habermas’ account in his book Between Facts and Norms, biased by a Parsonian perspective, falls apart to some extent, because he fails to consider that the capacity for moral judgement rests upon the indissoluble connection between cognitive operations, on the one hand, and emotional dispositions and attitudes, on the other. No affectively neutral normative justification can be possible, if (the feeling of) self-affirmation on the part of the participants in a deliberative process constitutes an essential component of normative justifications. In this regard, it should be noted that according to Habermas a deliberative process should consist of real deliberation between real citizens, unlike Rawls’ account of the original position and the veil of ignorance. In summary, social and political action, but also real deliberation, require of passion and affects. In other words, “neither human agency nor practical reason can be abstracted entirely from affective concerns. Any theory of justice that
fails to account for this fact faces not only a motivational deficit but also a normative one” (Krause 2008: 46).

Within the field of political theory two authors – Remo Bodei and Martha Nussbaum – should be credited for initiating a systematic reintroduction of the topic of political passions. In his insightful book Geometria delle Passioni, Bodei advances a systematic critique of the reason/passion dichotomy. He suggests that passions prepare, preserve, memorize and re-elaborate the “reactive meanings” that are immediately attributed to objects, persons and events that human beings encounter in specific settings. Therefore, “to gain knowledge of passions is nothing else but to analyse reason itself though against the grain, illuminating reason with its own alleged shadow” (Bodei 1991: 12). Going beyond the myth of “the cancer of reason,” Bodei proceeds, by revising a vast literature, from Aristotle to the Stoics, from Spinoza to the Jacobins, to show the classic connections and ruptures between reason and passion. This leads to a renewed appraisal of Spinoza (agreeing in this respect with Damasio 2003: 169) – though also with Tocqueville (in accordance with Elster 2009) – since Spinoza did not demand from individuals, for the first time in many centuries, self-sacrifice and the sacrifice of their passions in the name of God or in the name of the State. This is because Spinoza did not consider passions (love, hate, anger, compassion, fear and hope) as vices but as intrinsic properties of the human nature. To put it in his own terms, he conceived them as “imaginative knowledge.” Indeed, Spinoza rejected any clear-cut distinctions between knowledge and passion, between soul and body and altruism and self-interest. Within the history of ethics, he is undoubtedly the thinker that has distanced himself most from these dichotomies. For Bodei, Spinoza’s attempt to go beyond fear and hope is especially interesting, for it gives rise to a whole new perspective, which is different from that of realist thinkers (Hobbes), who accept the given order of things, but also from that of utopian thinkers (Aquinas), who take the world just as it should be. Spinoza did not accept either the notion of “calm passion,” i.e. those types of passions initially introduced by Hobbes and then more fully elaborated by Hume. Nevertheless, these authors established with his notion of “calm passion” the indissoluble bond between moral appreciation, on the one hand, and pride, shame, love or hate, on the other one (Martínez Marzoa 2009: 68). These emotions would later be postulated as those emotions (e.g. the pursuit of profit) most suited to be rationalized and transformed (through domination, channelling or weakening) into interests, which are objects of calculation and negotiation (Hirschman 1977).

For her part, Martha Nussbaum has advanced certainly the most fully-fledged and substantive philosophical account of passions, and has provided many insights to political theory in particular. As early as 1994, in her book
Therapy of Desire she embarked on a systematic effort to take up the theme of passions studied by Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans, whose philosophical accounts had been largely disregarded by contemporary ethics and political theory. According to Nussbaum, Aristotle should be credited for arguing against the conception of passions as blind animal forces. On the contrary, he depicted passions as having definitely cognitive and perceptive qualities, which are associated to certain types of beliefs. Precisely this image of emotions explains the current popularity of a normative theory that considers passions as indispensable elements of the good life, thus arguing for its education, as they constitute a conditio sine qua non of virtuous action. Thus, a citizen having phronesis will not only manage a concrete situation in accordance with reason, but also in an emotionally adequate manner. Nussbaum points out certain key aspects of the Aristotelian conception of passions that resonate with present philosophical, psychological and neuroscientific insights on this topic: 1) passions are intentional forms of consciousness (i.e. they are ‘about’ something); 2) that are closely linked to beliefs; 3) and can be characterized as rational or irrational, true or false; in other words, they are not always correct, similarly to beliefs and actions,. 4) Passions can be modified by changing the beliefs, and thus they can, and should, be educated in accordance with an adequate conception of the Good life. Nevertheless, for Nussbaum the Hellenistic thought developed by the Stoics and the Epicureans is richer and analytically sounder than that of Aristotle; in particular, regarding the way it conceives the relations between emotions and beliefs, its image of the evaluative dimension of emotion and the connection that it establishes between emotional life and (a tragic) Weltanschauung (Nussbaum 1994: 514).

In her book Upheavals of Thought, Nussbaum develops further this conception of emotion as an integral part of ethical thinking and thus as a crucial substantive component of moral philosophy. In this book, she highlights particularly the cognitive and evaluative dimensions of emotions and their role in making value judgements. In this regard, emotions can be useful or misleading for the task of making ethical decisions, but they have to be considered – so the argument goes – as one of the basic human capacities (in the sense attributed to this expression by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum herself). Hence, she advances a concept of emotion that is based upon three interrelated dimensions: (1) the cognitive evaluation of an object, (2) eudaimonia, i.e. personal development and flourishing; (3) the assessment and appraisal of external objects that are important for one’s goals and happiness. Moreover, Nussbaum addresses an Aristotelian topic that remained underdeveloped in Therapy of Desire; namely, the irreducible social dimension of emotions – also highlighted by other authors (Gross 2006: 41) –, which she discusses together with their evaluative dimen-
sion. This leads to a constructivist conception of emotions that regards them as determined by specific norms, cultural elements, language and social structure. Accordingly, she advances a crucial argument concerning the links between passions, capacities and conceptions of the good life: “in an ethical and socio/political creature, emotions themselves are ethical and socio/political, part of an answer to the questions, ‘What is worth caring about?’ ‘How should I live?’” (Nussbaum 2001: 149)

These and further reflections have definitely had an impact on the discipline of political theory; in particular on current debates on deliberative democracy, triggering an “affective turn” hand in hand with an “incremental inclusion of empathy” (Morrell 2010: 84). These reflections by Nussbaum resonate with concerns previously raised within that paradigm. More specifically, they have contributed to temper partially the hyperrationalist and argumentative bias that characterized the first theories of deliberation, which were too focused on consensus. It should be recalled in this context that the model of deliberative democracy is claimed to be an improvement not only over representative but also over participatory models of democracy, since both representative and participatory models regard citizens’ preferences as given and thus as exogenous, i.e. as pre-political. Preferences should be aggregated or expressed directly, according to these models. In contrast, deliberative democracy opposes to this idea the notion of endogenous preferences, that is to say, a conception of democracy in which preferences are politically produced through uncoerced debates among equal participants. However, though this image of democracy in which preferences can be endogenously transformed through public egalitarian discussion remains attractive, it is evident that it is strongly influenced by a notion of reason that, to a large extent, rests upon the reason/passion dichotomy that we have already discussed here. Hence it can be argued that: (1) the neglect of the affective components of deliberation is nothing else but (2) the other side of dissensus and conflict inherent to politics. This is the unavoidable consequence of a rationalist image of deliberation that underlies expressions such as “the force of the better argument” (Pellizioni 2001), “reasoned argument for the purpose of resolving political conflict” (Knight and Johnson 1994: 285) or “epistemic conception of democracy” (Cohen 1986; Gutmann and Thompson 1996) – not to mention the overestimation of the chances of reaching a “rational consensus” (Habermas 1996).

If we consider the work of J. Elster, Deliberative Democracy, to take just an example, we will notice that the “pathologies” of deliberation mentioned in this volume are always closely related to emotional biases (e.g. manipulation, adaptation, distortions of preferences) (Elster 1998). In Fishkin’s book Democracy and Deliberation, demagogy is always associated to unbounded emotions
(“aroused publics,” “stirring up” and so on) that undermine the equanimity of a deliberative process (Fishkin 1991). The same holds true for Cohen’s essay in the compilation *Deliberative Democracy* by Bohman and Rehg (1997). The notion of *reason* is continuously mentioned without considering the emotional context in which reasons are given and accepted, or considering this emotional context just marginally, without any theoretical elaboration.

To our aims, the problem lies in an image of deliberation too influenced by scientific epistemology and its standards of objectivity (Lynch 2000: 47); or to put it another way, in a conception of the political debate that is scarcely pragmatic and informal and excessively logic-rationalist. Indeed, an increasing number of theorists of deliberative democracy, even some of the most decisive for the development of this theory, are censuring, and arguing against, this hyperrationalist image of deliberation. Bohman, for example, discussing Habermas’ approach criticizes the Kantian hyperrationality resulting from translating the standards applied to scientific or philosophical knowledge to the political realm. At an early stage of the theory’s development, he formulated a sophisticated critique of Habermas’ account arguing for the need to pay more attention to the perlocutionary speech acts (irony, metaphors, art…), with preference to those illocutionary, in the emancipatory discourse, and thus for the necessity for retrieving the disregarded, or even proscribed dimension of rhetoric (Bohman 1988 and 1996). Gutmann and Thompson consider the affective modes of consciousness as a crucial catalyst for deliberation – though this argument does not alter the rationalist image of deliberation held by both authors, who nevertheless reject the “dichotomy between reason and passion” (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 50).

However, the claim that emotions cannot be the leading factor of deliberation and, in contrast, that only those expressions that can be explicitly formulated in a speech act should be taken into account, cannot lead to ignoring that emotions, *empathy* for example, play a crucial role in deliberation. In other words, empathy and other relational emotions must be considered the own soul of democracy (Rifkin 2010: 165), they are necessary factors that foster communication, reciprocity and motivate citizens to participate; furthermore they fuel a pluralistic and tolerant antagonism that constitutes the very basis of any debate (Morrell 2010). Emotions like *empathy* constitute a key factor for the egalitarian inclusion of certain social groups in a deliberative process, while other emotions, *disgust* for example, exclude other groups from deliberation. In short, positive and relational emotions and sentiments are required to “assist the epistemic value of the process of argumentation” (Nino 2003: 175).

The criticisms advanced by authors working outside the theory of deliberative democracy are even more fundamental. Thus, for example, from the field of
empirical research, Marcus highlights, considering the latest advances in the fields of neuroscience and psychology, the untenability of an “application of deliberative reason that necessarily excludes emotion” (Marcus 2002: 7). On the contrary, emotions provide “an intermediate link between biology and norms,” implying social morality is not a mere choice but a disposition that guarantees a successful coordination between citizens. Emotions, hence, constitute the condition of possibility of any public ethic (Ovejero 2008: 266).

Within the field of political theory, Iris Marion Young in her formulation of an inclusive democracy deconstructs the hyperrationalist notion of “impartiality” (1990: 175). She argues for alternative forms of judgement, namely for forms that incorporate emotions, and criticizes compellingly the notion of (a “dispassionate and disembodied” form of) speech deployed by the early theory of deliberation (Young 2000: 39). Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have been even more radical in their critique. According to them, collective identities cannot be explained relying solely on the argumentative and symbolic nature of reality. In contrast, emotions are crucial to account for them (Mouffe 2000 and 2002; Laclau 2005). From a psychoanalytic perspective, both these authors establish a close link between two topics: (1) the key function of rhetoric in the process of meaning-creation, which is conceived of as a permanent contamination of literality and grammar (i.e. the logical) by metaphor and synecdoche. This, in turn, requires (2) the concurrence of emotions so as to make political signification possible. In other words, what is required is the indissoluble articulation of cognitive and emotional components. Hence, emotions should be conceived not only as associated to expressive functions (expression of preferences or identities) but as constitutive of the political itself. Stressing the relevance of rhetoric as support for empathy, as Morrell has argued, is really key to a better approach to “the interconnections among affect, cognition and reason and provides a better understanding of how a deliberative democracy will likely function than those theories that rely upon unrealistic, cognitive understandings of rationality” (Morrell 2010: 149).

Recently, making use of the notion of “passionate utterance” and the Emersonian model of adversative democracy formulated by Stanley Cavell (Cavell 1990 and 2005), Aletta Norval has maintained that it is necessary to relate language and passion (a classic topic of psychoanalysis) in order to re-imagine deliberative democracy and integrate emotional expressions (Norval 2007). However, it is in the crucial books by Martha Nussbaum, Sharon Krause (and Michael Morrel) that we find two path-breaking and promising attempts to integrate systematically passion into the theory of deliberative democracy.

Developing further a research strand already discussed in this chapter, Nussbaum presents in her book Hiding from Humanity, the only available sys-
tematic (and controversial) analysis of the functionality and adequacy of different passions to deliberation. Summarizing, her argument brings together: (1) her Aristotelian thesis that beliefs and emotions are closely linked, that emotions are evaluative and can be evaluated, and (2) her capability approach: We all have certain necessities and basic capabilities, though we are also handicapped in different ways and to varying degrees, for we all lack to some extent certain “functionings” that are essential to flourishing as human beings. Acknowledging the evaluative function of emotions (in terms of the benefits and costs that follow from a particular decision), as well as the need for assessing emotions themselves, Nussbaum raises the following question: Which emotions are relevant to political deliberation? In this regard, her subtle analysis leads her to the conclusion that anger and compassion, for instance, are crucial for a deliberative process, as well as fear, grieve, love and gratitude. On the other side, however, shame and repugnancy should be in principle expelled from the public sphere, since they tend to exclude certain individuals and social groups from public discussion (Nussbaum 2004). In her recent manifest Not for profit Nussbaum concretizes further her previous theory of moral and anti-moral emotions. From her perspective of an “Education for Democracy,” disgust merits special critical scrutiny due to 1) its nature not merely visceral, provided its “strong cognitive component;” and 2) its capacity in involving self-repudiation and “the displacement of self-repudiation onto another group” fuelling dangerous stereotypes and exclusionary dichotomies pure/impure, we/they, friend/foe. Very differently, compassion develops the necessary capacity for empathy, to see the world from the viewpoint of other people and, in this way, for looking at another person as and end and not merely as an instrumental means (Nussbaum 2010).

Finally, in her book Civil Passions, Sharon Krause provides an innovative “new politics of passion” inspired upon the philosophical tradition of moral sentiment (from Hume to Bernard Williams) and on the latest insights provided by neuroscience and neuropsychology, aimed at providing a theoretic and systematic place for passions in public deliberation. Her main goal is to overcome the normative and motivational deficit of the classic version of deliberative theory which, by distinguishing too sharply between ‘reasons’ and ‘passions’, fails to integrate the motivations of the participants into the process of deliberation. To this aims, Krause argues for a new ideal of “impartiality” that is reformulated as “a reflexive sensitivity to the sufferings and the joys of others,” understood as the feeling of respect for others as morally significant persons (Krause 2008: 5). In summary, an “affective engaged impartiality” that is supposed to go beyond the endemic motivational and normative deficit of delibera-
tive theory without ignoring the task of providing judgement and deliberation with standards of impartiality.

First, Krause reformulates the notion of public reason by defining it as a heterogeneous group of “common concerns” or “shared horizons of concerns” within which public discussions combine sensitivity, “care” and reflection. Thus, a “politics of civil passion” manages not to fall back into the aforementioned motivational deficit, since it succeeds in linking moral sentiments and impartiality to the affective sources that promote the participation of citizens in public deliberation. It should be noted, however, that this links operates in two ways: the contents of moral sentiments are fluid, socially constructed and thus subject to revision, since passions themselves depend upon deliberation and the outcomes of deliberation. Hence, the relation between moral sentiments and democratic deliberation is decisive: By providing the political conditions of equality, which in turn increase attentiveness to the sentiments of others, and by allowing the integration of a wide range of sentiments in the public sphere, deliberative democracy manages to broaden with unique efficacy public imagination and to educate the moral sentiments of the citizens. Second, Krause provides a coherent criterion for determining normatively which emotions are admissible in the public sphere; namely, only those that can be accepted from a moral point of view that is consistent with the principles of public reason (Krause 2008: 163). Third, from this point of view, social norms are intrinsically, and not contingently, connected to the diverse human motives; practical reason incorporates affective elements and the moral sentiment incarnates this unalienable connection.

Thus, in the present state of the debate, moving beyond the classic reason/passion dichotomy and its corollary (i.e. the exclusion of emotions from political theory and political science) requires a growing interdisciplinarity and, in particular, taking into account the insights gained by neuroscience, social-psychology and the epistemology of the social sciences. Far from promoting a pendulum-like movement between the two extremes of the binary code, that is, far from arguing for ‘more passion’ in politics – as some catchphrases suggest, e.g. ‘new politics of passion’, ‘central role of passions’ et cetera –, what is required is to re-think the articulation between emotional and cognitive elements in politics. This is necessary in order to analyse the irreducible dimensions of decision-making: social mobilization, public contestation and the conflicting relations between collective identities. Acknowledging that emotions do play a crucial role in politics does not undermine, however, the significance of strategic interaction between political actors. Indeed, one of the most promising areas of research in political science is to analyse the mutual relationships between
strategic behaviour and emotions, for example by resorting to game theory (Lu-
pia and Menning 2007; Elster 2007).

Current and certainly solid research from multiple disciplines demonstrates
emotion is: (1) a necessary explicative variable of political reasoning – this
forces us to reconsider the boundaries of rationality, even of broadened and
bounded notions of rationality –, as well as (2) a valuable autonomous norma-
tive concept that accounts for an indispensable and crucial dimension of politics
– this requires nuanced theoretical critique of the diverse roles of different emo-
tions (fear, disgust, empathy, compassion etc.). In any case, however, we have
just begun to clarify how emotions intervene, together with reason, in public
deliberation, moral judgement, public mobilization and decision-making. More-
over, we have just begun to elucidate an even deeper conundrum; namely,
which are the mechanisms that determine preference formation.

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