This is the hour of the Indian peoples of all Mexico. We call on them to fight on with us for the rights that history, reason and truth have given us. We call on them to take up with us our inheritance of struggle and resistance, and to act together peacefully throughout the land to let all know that we are the root of the Nation, its valid foundation, its militant present, its inclusive future.

Fifth Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle

July 19th

1998

For students of the Zapatist National Liberation Army (EZLN), the events surrounding the Mexican Federal election of 2006, and the subsequent mass protests of the supporters of losing PRD candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, testified to the divorce between the EZLN and many of its former allies on the Mexican political, intellectual and Indianist left, who by that time were viewed by neozapatists as traitors to the cause. Together with serious discrepancies and rifts between the EZLN and the indigenous organizations and communities that for many years constituted its social base, these events highlighted the increasing isolation of the EZLN and the scant success of its "Other Campaign" in its pursuit of "an anticapitalist national leftist uprising" (Castellanos 2008:117). In this article, on the basis of an analysis of neozapatist discourse, I show how part of the causes of this estrangement lie in the shifting neozapatist position in regard to one of its fundamental elements, its Mexican nationalist perspective on the defence of indigenous rights and autonomy.

The enormous literature on the neozapatist movement and the EZLN that has accumulated since their irruption on the Mexican and international scene in January 1994 has generally paid little formal analytical attention to their political discourse; the few exceptions include studies by Leyva Solano (1999), Stephen (2002), Chihu Amparán (2002) and Van den Berghe (2005). This hiatus is somewhat surprising in regard to a guerilla movement that at a very early stage - 1994 - was already proclaiming its discovery of "the word as weapon", and which in fact proceeded to make such massive politico-strategic use of extremely
innovative rhetoric as to elicit references to a "war of words" (Volpi 2004), "war of paper", or "war of ink, of written word, a war on the Internet" (this last from the Mexican foreign secretary in 1995, José Ángel Gurría). In the hundreds of declarations, communiqués and other writings that it has distributed to national and international organizations, made known through the Mexican daily La Jornada and other media, or published on its own web page, it has constructed an original textual universe that has proved enormously effective in its national and international impact.

Most EZLN documents of importance have been written by its leader, Subcommander Marcos. They are striking for their clearly purposeful, clearly politically intended pursuit of style, which breaks the classical mould of the political or military communiqué to create novel hybrid forms. Short stories are intercalated in the body of political manifestos; intertextuality is a ubiquitous rhetorical resource; deliberately highlighted polysemy unites the traditional and the modern, the postcommunist and the communal, the democratic and the militarist; and the texts themselves are ironically deconstructed together with the persona of their author. This insistence on style has been a continuous hallmark of the EZLN: contrary to Bellinhausen's premature diagnosis (La Jornada, February 7th 1994), there has been no "semantic phase of the revolution", but a permanent semantic thread throughout its history, beginning, as we shall see, with the early exclusion of a key element of its initial lexicon, "revolution". Furthermore, this stylistic endeavour has also influenced the language used by certain Indian leaders: not only does Marcos employ literal translations of indigenous expressions such as Tojolabal tojol winik ("true men"); through a kind of feedback phenomenon, these leaders have taken up idioms and turns of phrase belonging to the "indigenous" Spanish concocted by Marcos, such as "No ahí estaba".

The success of Latin American Indianist movements has involved three kinds of factor. The first is the existence and exploitation of favourable social conditions and political opportunity structures; this component has been analysed in detail by Yashar (2005) and Van Cott (2005), among others, and will not be dealt with further here. The second is the way in which these movements have been organized through innovative coordination formats, and their non violent repertories of contention. The subject of this paper is the third factor, their discourse and its dynamic mechanisms and devices. In what follows, I apply frame analysis (Snow 2005) to explore the rhetoric-political strategies of identity of neozapatist discourse. I shall attempt to identify their essential structural principles and specific mechanisms, and to point out the politico-
semantic shifts that have taken place in the course of 15 years of progressive differentiation between "them" (los de arriba, those at the top) and "us" (los hombres y mujeres verdaderos, true men and women). The corpus on which the analysis is based comprises the communiqués issued by the EZLN between 1994 and 2008 (EZLN 1994, 1995, 1997, 2003a, 2003b, 2005), including the six Declarations from the Lacandon Jungle (DLJs); the narrative texts produced during this period by Marcos, its modestly styled but de facto leader (Subcomandante Marcos 1998, 1999, 2009, which as noted above are one with his overtly political writings; and the texts of some of his more extensive interviews (Le Bot 1997; Ramonet 2001; Vázquez Montalbán 1999; Castellanos 2008).

1. Interpretive frames and political strategies of identity

Analysts have placed increasing emphasis on viewing social movements as politico-cultural phenomena capable of creating collective identities and universes of sense. Indeed, it has repeatedly been shown that such movements do generate values, beliefs and symbols that come to be shared by their members (Johnston and Gusfield 1994; Melucci 1996). In the case of interest here, numerous studies have found that contemporary Indianist movements, which by definition appeal to the putative historical and cultural backgrounds of their followers, are not the mere manifestation of pre-extant objective ethnolinguistic realities, but rather consist in the selective use of this rich and varied inheritance by their leaders to create - both within and without the movement itself - an assumption or acknowledgement of identity that makes the movement internally coherent and politically significant.

There thus comes about the following paradox. On the one hand, the identity of an indigenous community, like that of any other group, is not immutable, but continually redelimited and recharacterized in response to a variable external context and internal evolution; given accounts of the history and traditions of the community, and even the very existence of a separate tongue, are reinterpreted, and the identity of the community reconstituted, in the course of political action. Yet the objective of this process is to make the identity so instituted be seen as self-evident, as essentially homogeneous and ancestral. In other words, the construction of a common identity requires a process of frame alignment (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow 2005) that, in acute contrast with rational philosophy and practice, wipes out its own traces. By these means is raised to predominance an interpretive frame that prioritizes the subject's indigenous identity over alternatives based on class, religion, caste or other differential characteristics, which along with their implications for political action are played down in favour of the Indianist
vision. Through resonance with the more of less diffuse beliefs and traditions making up the ethnic self-awareness of various component groups, the common identity comes to be assumed as a self-evident fact of nature rather than as the expression of a contingent, merely political alliance.

The framing devices through which Indianist discourse pursues the identification of the individual with the Indianist community comprise ethical, empirical and aesthetic elements. Ethically, they present this relationship as a duty towards an entity endowed with a territory and with a political right to self-determination and to its own tongue and customs. Empirically, they point to distinctive characteristics (language, race, territory, etc.) as objective evidence of the reality of this entity. Aesthetically, they exalt, reinforce or supply cultural features such as a circular rather than a linear concept of time, the plasticity of the community's language, and the myth of a golden age in which an undivided community lived in harmony and happiness - a myth that is particularly striking in the case of Chiapas, where the community defended by the EZLN comprises several dozen ethnolinguistically distinguishable groups with different origins and histories (Leyva Solano 1996:171; Rus 1995, 2005; Pérez Ruiz 2005). However, Indianist discourse differs both from assimilationist State-promoted indigenist policies (Favre 1996; Sánchez 1999) and from the nostalgia of the Latin American indigenist novel (Máiz 2005) in seeking disruptive political mobilization. The way it does so may be analysed in terms of three main functional kinds of discourse frame - diagnostic, prognostic and motivational - plus an initial or all-embracing "master frame" in which the problem to be resolved by the Indianist movement is defined.

Diagnostic frames identify certain events or situations as problems or wrongs that are themselves merely so many cultural, political or economic manifestations of the problem, the "Indian question". And they point not only to objective causes of these wrongs, but also to causative agents: persons or institutions, within or without the community, who profit from the community's ills. They thus define antagonists, replacing the multicausal complexity of social issues with a simplified, personalized account, reinforcing the distinction between the "true" community and outsiders or renegades, and strengthening the internal cohesion of the community by providing a common enemy against whom to unite.

Prognostic frames present an alternative, a plan, a solution to the previously diagnosed ethnic, political, cultural and economic problems. They set a general goal (the regeneration of the community as a distinct, homogeneous indigenous entity with a politically expressed self-awareness); they specify concrete political objectives
Finally, motivational frames, or action frames, both incite to action and define the repertory of possible actions. In the former role they paint the situation of the community in dramatic colours, appeal to the memory of bygone heroes, exaggerate internal homogeneity and differences with respect to other communities, and make final victory unquestionable; in the latter they fit means to ends, determining whether goals be pursued by violence or through peaceful protest, participation in elections and parliamentary activity.

The rhetorical devices sketched above can create a collective consciousness with vast capacity for mobilization, and the more intensely emotional, radical and exclusive the Indianist discourse - the sharper and deeper it draws its distinctions between "them" and "us" - the greater its power of mobilization is. On the other hand, the pursuit of mobilization power at the expense of fraternity with external groups has its dangers: firstly, that in emphasizing too radically the separate identity of too small a community it may reduce the community's real political power by isolating it from potential allies; and secondly, that it may surrender control of the community to its most extremist members. As we shall see, the EZLN, which has generally attempted to employ frame-bridging framing strategies in which Indianism meshes with democratic, nationalist, anticolonial and antiglobalization discourses (Fig. 1), has suffered the consequences of this dilemma, though not in the way that might be expected of an Indianist movement.

2. The evolution of EZLN identity-framing strategies

I argue here that neozapatist discourse, which, symbolized by its "true men", was initially extraordinarily effective both inside and outside Chiapas in its criticism of the establishment, became a source of internal conflict and self-isolation when, as the result of both internal factors (the military structure of the EZLN) and external pressures (the closure of avenues of political opportunity), it drifted towards more radical positions. This evolution can be traced through three successive periods with distinct framing strategies: 1993-1994 (armed rebellion); 1995-2003 (Indianism); and 2004-2008 (anti-capitalist leftism).


A discourse dominated by incitement to armed rebellion had only a fleeting existence in EZLN history. Indeed, more
than characterizing the fully-fledged EZLN itself, it should be regarded as belonging to the final stages of its gestation, a lengthy process that had begun in 1983 through contact between the leaders of a residual focalist (foguismo) guerrilla and Indian leaders fighting for political and cultural autonomy - "three Indians and three mixed-bloods, Mexicans all" (EZLN 1995:131). Marcos himself has acknowledged the ideological confusion of this "first, very hazy synthesis, a mixture of patriotism, of the inheritance of the clandestine Mexican left of the sixties, of elements of indigenous culture, of historical Mexican military traditions, of what the Central and South American guerrillas had been, of the national liberation movements" (Le Bot 1997:174). This eclecticism is manifest in the contrast between the opening of DLJ1, which implicitly announces an indigenous movement ("We are the product of 500 years of strife"), and the spirit of other texts produced up to January 1995 (including DLJ2), which may be described as Marxist nationalism in their definition of the problem to be resolved as the PRI's "betrayal of the nation" through its political oppression, exploitation and expropriation of the peasantry (Fig. 2). Rather than pointing to specifically race-related factors, the recurrent motifs in the diagnostic frame presented in these texts are aspects of the Mexican political system: "the party of the State", the PRI's "70-year dictatorship", political corruption, systematic electoral fraud, political assassinations, militarism, presidentialism. Those responsible for these ills, the antagonists, are the Salinas government ("motherland-sellers", "traitors"), together with the Mexican Federal Army, local political bosses, and the Mexican political élite in general (described as "thieves of hope"), though not forgetting "the capitalism that is bleeding Chiapas to death" (Chiapas: el Sureste en dos vientos, una tormenta y una profecía; EZLN 1994:49).

In keeping with the diagnosis, the accompanying prognostic frame proposes exclusively left-wing nationalist solutions (national liberation, "national sovereignty", a more equitable "new Mexico") to be implemented through a transition from PRIist dictatorship to democracy. Though DLJ1 called only for compliance with Art. 39 of the existing Mexican Constitution ("National sovereignty resides ... in the people. ... The people have ... the right to alter and modify their form of government"), DLJ2 calls for a new Constitution to be drawn up by a National Democratic Convention so denominated in evocation of the 1914 Aguascalientes Convention. In early discourse the protagonists of this change are to be the EZLN rebels and their class of origin: the poor peasantry, ambiguously called upon as "peasants and Indians", "men of corn" who to overcome the invisibility of the Indian in the mixed-blood
nation State - symbolized by the EZLN balaclavas - must provide a face for "those who are faceless" (Castellanos 2008:54). Later, in the course of 1994, the proposed leading class is expanded to embrace "the Mexican people", "a new political class" that must replace the corrupt, back-scratching PRI and refound the Mexican nation under the inspiration of the original myths of the War of Independence and the Revolution; but this re-birth of the nation must respect the dignity and equality of the indigenous peoples. Among the demands of March 3rd 1994 are that the languages of all ethnic groups be co-official and their teaching obligatory from primary school to university, and that "our rights and dignity as indigenous peoples be respected, and our culture and tradition taken into account" (EZLN 1994:182); and the communiqué of April 10th 1994 concerning "Votán Zapata" sets about the dissolution of ethnic, class and religious differences in the collective indigenous identity of "the people of nocturnal passage", "the voiceless", "the foreigners in their own land", "the people of eternal death", "the landless and tomorrowless", "those of the long night of scorn", "the true men and women". In this latter text, the fascinating introduction of Votán Zapata, a mythical hybrid incarnating the tzeltal god Votán in the legendary figure of Emilano Zapata, insinuates the existence of political bonds of identity between the diverse local indigenous communities, and supports a pluriethnic reformulation of the Mexican nation (Stephen 2002:164).

The proposed repertory of action undergoes a marked change during this period, from the initial declaration of war in DLJ1 ("Hope with a trigger"), with its conventional military symbols (distinctive uniform and flag) and its classical guerrilla strategy of besieging cities, to the "Hope of the great mass mobilizations" of the "army that wants to disband" following the cease-fire. The objectives become the pluralist mobilization of national civil society, the consolidation of "a new breed of party", the free celebration of democratic elections and, in spite of the latter, the creation of an assemblyist participative format allowing leaders to "govern in obedience" through direct consultation with grass roots on strategy. From the very beginning, the EZLN thus granted direct democracy precedence over representative democracy in the formulation of strategies.


For most of the 16-year period examined in this paper, specifically between 1995 and 2004, the dominant identity strategy of the EZLN was Indianist. The early, confused mixture of patriotism and focalist guerrilla ideology was abandoned in favour of a master frame - summarizable in the phrase "the dignity of the Indian" - that is most fully
enunciated in DLJ5 (1998) and in the speeches made during the march upon Mexico City (the "March of the Colour of the Earth") that took place in 2001 (EZLN 2003). In expressions such as "rebellious dignity", "peace with justice and dignity as surnames" or "reason and the dignity of history", the concept of dignity was ubiquitous in this period, as is stressed by Marcos' words when celebrating the thirteenth anniversary of the uprising in 2007: "The history of the EZLN is the history of a dignity made communal". The adversities under which this dignity had been and continued to be maintained during "the long night of 500 years" were "the grave living conditions of indigenous Mexicans", cultural and economic impoverishment, political disempowerment, the "war of extermination" and "genocide" to which they were subjected. There was thus a marked political and symbolic shift from the peasant to the Indian as central figure (Collier 1999:158), although certain elements of the earlier discourse were nevertheless retained (Fig. 4). More specifically, the denouncement of poverty, exclusion, oppression and the consequences of neoliberal policies were joined in a new synthesis by cultural, political and economic Indianism. Not only is the co-official status of native tongues demanded: ethnic identity is now given precedence over class (which nevertheless remains important); customary law is upheld against statute law; appeal to "land" nows refers not to the peasant's means of production (its primary reference in the historical Zapatist slogan Tierra y libertad!), but to a motherland, a territory endowed with political autonomy and the home of tradition; the circular time of myth is opposed to linear historical time; pluriethnic mobilization is to pursue the refoundation of the Mexican State with a multicultural ideology replacing the traditional Mexican doctrine of the cosmic race; and the collective rights of indigenous communities are superimposed on, and may take precedence over, the rights of the individual as citizen.

The shift of emphasis sketched above did not mean that economic concerns vanished from the EZLN agenda, or that its democratic, antineoliberal and nationalist commitment was abandoned, but rather that these elements played a somewhat different role in the newly synthesized discourse. In the new diagnostic frame (Fig. 3), causes of the Indian's plight are picked out in three areas: the nation, the State, and the indigenous communities themselves. Nationally, Mexico is "moribund", its wealth sold off, its roots in the War of Independence and the Revolution forgotten. The State is, as before, diagnosed as rotten, identified with the party of the State; electoral fraud is the norm, political corruption rife, and the neoliberal collusion between Government and Finance promotes denationalization, delocation and emigration. The indigenous communities are repressed by ignoring their
culture, by effectively excluding Indians from the benefits of national citizenship, and by "genocide war". Those responsible still include the PRI, successive Presidents (Salinas, Zedillo), and the Mexican political and economic élite, now significantly labelled as "racist" and as "Neoconquistadors"; but these antagonists are now joined by the neoliberal "Internationale of terror" (multinational corporations, the IMF), with which is contrasted the "Internationale of hope".

The alternatives proposed by the new prognostic frame at the national level confirm that the Indian question is seen not as a local or sectorial issue, but as a "national struggle", "a national dialogue" for the "incorporation of the indigenous peoples in the nation": a multicultural, plural "new Mexican nation", "a motherland with room for all its peoples" and "all its tongues". Accordingly, the EZLN seeks "new custody of the nation" and its symbols once they have been wrested from the traitorous élite, thereby eschewing separatism, isolationism and ethnic fundamentalisms such as Mayan nationalism in favour of an openly political Indianism. At the level of State institutions, proposed alternatives continue to insist on the need to replace "the one-party political system" through a "transition to democracy"; on the need for "free and fair elections" instead of systematic electoral fraud; and on the need for a National Democratic Convention to draw up "a new Constitution". And the indigenous communities are to recover "Indian pride and dignity" through the constitutional recognition of multiculturality, the recognition of cultural and political rights linked to autonomous territories (Burguete 1999; Collier 1999; Díaz Polanco 1991, 1997; De la Fuente 2006; Leyva Solano, Burguete and Speed 2008, and the enactment of an Indian Law that, in consonance with the proposal drawn up by the Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación (COCOPA), establishes pluriethnic political autonomy within the Mexican nation. Insistence on these latter issues increased as avenues of political opportunity were closed by the Mexican government’s failure to comply with the San Andrés Agreements, by the political and military harrassment of the EZLN, and by the passage of a Law of Indigenous Rights and Culture that betrayed the spirit of the COCOPA draft. In the absence of any prospect of legal autonomy, de facto autonomy was pursued, there was increasing friction with Indian organizations of a more moderate reforming bent (denigrated as "economicists"), and in mid-2001 the EZLN withdrew into a 20-month silence.

The proposed protagonists of the EZLN programme were to be "We the indigenous peoples", understood not as a closed group of original inhabitants from which the mixed-blood Mexican was to be excluded, but as a community open to all who might identify with it as the true foundation of
Mexico, "the root of the nation", "the Indian heart of the motherland", "the proud indigenous essence of the Mexican nation". This openness and inclusiveness is emphasized on two scales: firstly, with regard to the multiple indigenous ethnic groups themselves, by calling out the roll of all the 63 native tongues of Mexico in DLJ4 and DLJ5; secondly, by elimination of the distinction between Indian and mixed-blood that had been implicit in references to Marcos as a representative or spokesman of "We the indigenous peoples" - he is now implicitly an integral member of those peoples, included in the "We".

Although the EZLN remained intact as a military structure during this period, its repertory of action concentrated on non-violent mobilization and civil disobedience. In January 1996, DLJ4 announces the creation of the Zapatist National Liberation Front (FZLN) as "a new kind of political organization" - "not a party" - that does not exist to take part in elections (ruled out as ineffective for political action), but rather seeks the formation of a broad front that 1) comprises multiple centres of initiative (in contrast to the hierarchical vanguard party), constructing "a great network" - "the Internationale of hope" - among both Mexican and international "civil society"; 2) prioritizes the indigenous peoples - in the political sense sketched above - over other potential allies; and 3) is steadfast in its patriotic pursuit of national liberation, the birth of a new Mexico through the recognized struggle of the "Indian heart of the nation". Following the silence of 2001-2002, the emphasis on civil organization was strengthened by the grouping of neozapatist autonomous communities in caracoles coordinated by "Boards of Good Governance".

This synthesis of Indianism and Mexican nationalism is continually reflected in the language of EZLN declarations and communiqués of this period, with their stylistic structure reminiscent of indigenous oral tradition, their abundant peppering of both indigenous and Mexican Spanish idioms, and the intercalation of the tales of El viejo Antonio. But the role of linguistic devices is not limited to mere admixture; they are employed crucially to overcome the potential difficulties of "Indianist nationalist" identity through bidirectional synecdoche and metaphor: "Detrás de nosotros estamos ustedes" (literally "Behind us we are you"); "two gods that were one, .... Votán Zapata and Ik'al Zapata, the white Zapata and the black Zapata, that were both the same road for true men and women").

2.3. Anticapitalist leftism (2005-2008)

In 2005, in response to a) the strategy of successive Mexican governments of treating the Chiapas conflict as a thing of the past and the EZLN as irrelevant (while maintaining a massive military presence in Chiapas) and b)
persistent friction between neozapatist autonomous communities and other indigenous occupants of the municipalities in which they were located, the EZLN began to adopt a surprisingly immoderate tone while at the same time, in apparent paradox, launching the Other Campaign to attract supporters throughout Mexico. In its own words,

The time has come to take a step that is risky but worth while. Because united with other sectors of society who suffer the same deprivations as us, it may be possible to achieve what we need and deserve. Progress in the struggle of the indigenous peoples is only possible if the Indian joins with workers, peasants, students, teachers, employees, and so on - with workers in town and country.

DLJ6

The programme of this new stage in EZLN strategic history, first announced in the June 2005 communiqué entitled The (impossible) geometry? of power in Mexico, is most fully set forth in DLJ6 and in numerous documents generated by the Other Campaign, including in particular the series Zapatists and the Other Campaign: the pedestrians of history (Subcomandante Marcos 2006). As is intimated in the quotation above, the problem addressed in these texts is much more general and delocalized than in the previous stage, almost to the extent of constituting a "de-Indianization" of EZLN discourse: the underlying malady is now "capitalist barbarity", "unbridled capitalism", both in Mexico ("the capitalist system in Mexico is waging war throughout the land") and worldwide ("neoliberal globalization"). Strikingly, for the first time since 1993, the problem is formulated in fundamentally economic terms: "the economic model", "exploitation", "capitalist property". Mexican nationalism continues to be central to the discourse, but it is its economic facets that are highlighted: exploitation of foreign inspiration, emigration to the north, asymmetric foreign trade ("the great theft", "the sale of the motherland"), etc. The Mexican political system and its "repression of the discontented masses" are still criticized, but the criticism is incorporated in an explicative model of an economic nature, the causes diagnosed being "the capitalist system", "economic relationships as the backbone of the social system", "the ownership of the means of production" (Fig. 5). This pinpointing of capitalism as root cause had not previously been explicit in EZLN diagnostic frames since DLJ1, and even less had their terminology been so typically Marxist. In his December 2006 speech to the Confederation of Left-wing Anti-capitalist Political Organizations, Delegate Zero (Marcos) spoke of "the four wheels of capitalism: plunder, contempt, exploitation and repression", and integrated nationalist and anti-
establishment themes: "Behind the market and wages looms the hard core of the system, private ownership of the means of production and change. The new nations involved in the neo-conquest of Mexico consist of the banks, trade and industry, all in foreign hands. And their conquering armies and armies of occupation are congressmen, senators, mayors, governors ..." (Esto es tan otro y tan grande que no cabe en la geografía de arriba).

This Marxist framework radicalizes the EZLN view of its traditional concerns (neoliberalism, globalization, the PRI, etc.), making it incompatible with reformist approaches - back in 2000 Marcos had already written that "fascism lurks behind the European 'third way' ... and behind left-wing circles that fail to come out against neoliberalism in theory and in practice" (Nuestra siguiente programa: ¡Oximoron! (La derecha intelectual y el fascismo liberal). EZLN 2003:441) - and likewise placing "bourgeois" representative democracy in opposition to direct democracy ("direct contact, without intermediaries"). In a turn of enormous consequences for the EZLN's interests, it is now not just the PRI but the entire Mexican political class, and all parties, that are corrupt and traitorous: all parties, and all their candidates, are neoliberal, dominated without question by "liberal macroeconomic policies", their former ideological differences lost ("No more left, centre and right"); while the Mexican nation as a whole has become "deaf and dumb".

This extreme anti-establishment diagnosis implies a massive multiplication of the family of causative agents. Virtually all Mexican political parties and all Mexican politicians, not just the government, are decried as idle parasites: López Obrador (repeatedly equated with Salinas) and the PRD; the Workers' Party (PT); the National Democratic Convention convened by López Obrador following his election defeat; etc., etc. The only exceptions are minority extreme left-wing groups such as the Mexican Communist Party. Internationally, it is not only the USA as the world leader of neoliberalism that is rejected, but also a series of leftist Latin American leaders - not only Lula, but also the Indianist Morales. And a wide range of intellectuals, academics and writers who for years had supported the EZLN are now counted among its enemies for their criticism of its isolationist, anti-PRD policy (see, for example, Marcos' essay ¿Otra teoría? in La Jornada, March 25th 2006). This rejection of proven or plausible allies constitutes a striking about-turn with respect to the EZLN's markedly inclusivist previous history.

Prognostically, the Marxist turn of the EZLN is explicit in its identification of anti-capitalist left-wing strategies as the means of rousing and uniting "the forgotten, the dispossessed, the voiceless and faceless, the rebellious and honourable" (La Jornada, January 2nd
2007). Conventional Marxist vocabulary is recovered ("The destruction of the capitalist system will only be achieved if one or many movements face up to it and defeat it at its core, that is, the private ownership of the means of production and exchange"; see Subcomandante Marcos 2007, Part 1) - though sometimes with ironic apology ("their task was no longer to moderate the - pardon my French - class struggle"; Second Wind: An Honourable and Wrathful Endeavour, in Subcomandante Marcos 2009) - and even Marcos' typical narrative passages are now used to explain how Marxism "awakens people to how they are exploited" (Marxism according to the rebel Erika, the second of the Seven Tales for No-one, in Subcomandante Marcos 2009). Thus the "risky step" that is being taken in order to advance the struggle of the indigenous peoples aims at the construction of an alliance that is not, as before, a broad front including moderate circles for whom Marxism has no appeal, but a vanguard-party-like formation located "below and to the left": a group of anti-capitalist left-wing purists. Even so, it is a nationalist rather than an internationalist programme that is pursued, a "national programme of anticapitalist action": the Other Campaign is presented as a national campaign, and the objective is still a new Constitution for Mexico in spite of the "definitive break with the Government and all electoral parties". In its own words, the movement emanating from DLJ6 may be summarized as an "anticapitalist", "left-wing", "civil and pacific" "national" struggle that "fights for a new Constitution" by "constructing a national programme of anticapitalist action" through "another way of pursuing politics".

The protagonists of the newly announced struggle are "the exploited", a group that is repeatedly defined in terms that dilute its indigenous component amid a much wider set of groups that is significantly headed by the proletariat and the peasantry. For example, "the fundamental characteristics of our movement" that were submitted to the approval of adherents to the Other Campaign at the end of 2006 included not only those noted in the previous paragraph, but also that the movement include "workers of town and country, Indians, women, the young and the old, girls and boys, homosexuals, Lesbians, transexuals, etc., in other words, all the downtrodden (Propuesta de preguntas para la consulta interna de la Otra Campaña 2006). The diminished weight of Indianist demands in this programme, and of the indigenous peoples themselves, is corroborated in the Sixth Commission's interim accounts of the results of this survey, which report the predominant answers to the question "Who should belong to the Other Campaign?" to be "those who agree with DLJ6", "anticapitalists", "the ethical", "those who seek the common good", "the downtrodden", and "militants of unregistered parties", with no specific mention of
indigenous peoples. Moreover, the weight of the indigenous as such is possibly reduced further by the requirement that it should be only the rebellious exploited and the left-wing anticapitalist civil society of Mexico and elsewhere that should be admitted to the campaign; for example, commenting on the incidents in Viejo Velasco, Chiapas, in November 2006, in which several Indians were killed, the EZLN denied that the dead were EZLN supporters, thus implicitly leaving non-EZLN Indians to their fate. Finally, the EZLN's repertory of action completes its redefinition as an anti-establishment, anticapitalist national movement practicing "frontal, radical criticism". Its "other kind of politics" abjures participation in elections and any kind of alliance with conventional political parties, denouncing not only the neoliberalism of the Mexican parties, but the uselessness of bourgeois representative democracy as such. Examples of this policy of non-action include its dismissal of López Obrador, its self-exclusion from the National Democratic Convention assembled in his support, and its break with left-wing intellectuals who had always backed Marcos in his defence of Indian rights. Indeed, Marcos appears to revive a pre-1994 objective of Leninist revolution when, in language that is much less ironic than had been usual, he speaks of "the way left-wing militants used to" do things; and purist intolerance emerges in the call for those who do not feel identified with the ideas of the majority to leave the organization (Subcomandante Marcos 2006, Part 5). Added to this, the military nature of the EZLN is explicitly reinforced: its oft-postponed transformation in a civil movement seems to be finally abandoned, and there are no more references to the "army that wants to disband" or the "uselessness of armed conflict". Whereas in 1997 Marcos recognized that, although "everything tells us we should remain armed", "armed Zapatism cannot aspire to government if there is to be democracy" (Le Bot 1997), 10 years later he felt it necessary to remind his audience of the renewed increase in attacks on EZLN communities, and that "the EZLN is an army, of a very different kind, it's true, but an army" (Subcomandante Marcos 2007). 3. The structure of the political discourse of the EZLN Having surveyed the evolution of EZLN discourse between DLJ1 and the Other Campaign, in what follows I analyse its complex internal structure, which precludes the classification of the EZLN as a generic Indianist or indigenous guerrilla movement. To reduce the EZLN to a stereotype of this kind would be to ignore its evolution or to make that evolution quite unintelligible. As we have already seen (Fig. 1), EZLN discourse is a synthesis of several different currents that all, in spite of changes in their relative weights, remain active throughout the period
examined in this paper: nationalism, antineoliberalism/anticapitalism, democracy and Indianism. In what follows I analyse the discourse with respect to these four themes in turn.

3.1. Nationalism

... we came to the city in search of the motherland, the motherland that had forgotten us in the farthest corner of the country. ... We came to ask the motherland, our motherland: Why have you left us there so many years?

Segundo Informe del Diálogo de la Catedral, EZLN 1994:164

beneath this earth there is also motherland
and there is no-one to hear us
and we speak sincerely
.....
and we tell
the motherland
the small bitter tale
of those who died to love her
.....
those who taught us
that the motherland is loved
for example,
with gunfire, smiling

Problems, EZLN 1997:247

The assignment of the generic label of Indianist or indigenist, and the predominance of an interpretive frame of this kind in EZLN discourse during many years, has blinded many analysts to the permanent, intense presence of strictly nationalist ideological strands in this discourse throughout the period examined in this paper. Even when such strands are acknowledged, the fascination of the Indianist facet is such that they are regarded as having been abandoned at an early stage (Alcalde and Llorente 2002), or as an expression of the EZLN's aspiration to represent the indigenous peoples of all Mexico, not just Chiapas (Stephen 2003). From this perspective, the Other Campaign's sidelining of its indigenous support in favour of an heterogeneous assortment of other anti-establishment groups was indeed a bewildering move. However, this change in policy becomes less surprising if it is admitted that the EZLN has always had a strong nationalist bent and has always accepted six of the seven central tenets of nationalist ideology: 1. humankind is naturally divided in nations, i.e. substantial
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communities commanding loyalty, and the nation is fundamental in politics; 2. each nation is internally homogeneous, with an identity based on its differential cultural and linguistic ethnic features; 3. political or economic upheavals do not impinge on the existence of the nation, which survives with the support of its myths of a Golden Age followed by Decadence and Rebirth; 4. each nation differentiates itself from others through the opposition of “us” to “them”, “nationals” to “foreigners”, etc.; 5. the true existence and freedom of the individual citizen requires his or her identification with the nation (in the present case as “Mexicans”) so that loyalty to the nation prevails over other loyalties; 6. nations can only be free and realize their potential when possessing an independent sovereign State (note that the EZLN does not speak of the “self-determination” of the indigenous communities, but of their “autonomy”); 7. freedom and peace can only prevail worldwide when all nations are free and independent (adapted from Máliz 2003).

The only one of the above tenets that EZLN discourse rejects is the second, since it renounces cultural and linguistic homogeneity in favour of the plural concept of a nation in which “all its peoples and their tongues have their place” (DLJ4): unlike that of other Latin American Indianist movements, it avoids expressions that identify nation with ethnic group ("indigenous nations", "Mayan nation", etc.), and instead presents Indian claims in the setting of a political, economic and cultural regeneration of the Mexican nation. This is clear right from the beginning, when the early declarations and communiqués repeatedly appeal to the Mexican themes of the War of Independence and the Revolution while demanding "a new Mexico" that does not exclude its most authentic component: "under this flag lives the motherland .... This is the flag of Mexico, our flag. Under this flag there lives and dies a part of the country whose existence was ignored and despised by the powerful" (Segundo Informe del Diálogo de la Catedral EZLN 1994:164). Even during the EZLN’s most Indianist phase, when its political mobilization was strongest (1995-2002), this nationalist theme is never lost: "We, the original inhabitants of these lands, continue to be Mexicans because we were not comfortable under another name, or under any but a flag with an eagle devouring a serpent, on a white ground flanked by green and red" (Carta para agradecer apoyo desde el extranjero, EZLN 1995:283); and it is the "loss of national sovereignty", Mexico as a "moribund nation", the "destruction of the Mexican nation" and the "negation of its history" that continue to be seen as central causes of the state of the indigenous peoples. In fact, EZLN Indianism is always presented as a "national struggle" - "the motherland is alive and it is ours" (EZLN 1995:449) - that aims to
achieve, by means of a "national dialogue", a reformulation of the Mexican nation that includes the excluded, and to this end claims the "custody of the motherland" that has been usurped by others. This is likewise manifest in the repeated invocation of the heroes of the War of Independence (Morelos, Guerrero) and the Revolution (Villa, Zapata); in the application of other symbols of the Revolution to neozapastist entities ("Aguascalientes"); in referencing geographical locations (communiqués and declarations are emitted from "the mountains of the Mexican Southeast"); in repeated calls upon "national" or "Mexican" civil society, and the very interpretation of the motherland as civil society (Vázquez Montalbán 1999:154); and, not least, in the Mexicanisms mingled freely with Indianisms throughout Marcos' writings.

This Indianist Mexican nationalism leads to a constant rhetorical redefinition of "Mexicans" and "foreigners" in accordance with the fourth of the tenets of nationalist ideology listed above. Those who plunder or sell off the nation (the PRI, Salinas, etc.) are "foreigners" estranged from their purported motherland, while the indigenous peoples and their supporters are Mexicans, and the EZLN is the only true Mexican army ("Here the only Mexican army is the EZLN. The other is an armed group at the service of the powerful, with neither military honour or shame for serving falsehood", Comunicado sobre el festejo de la independencia, EZLN 1995:41). There thus emerge "two ideas of what a nation is, two countries, two Mexicos": on the one hand "their nation", the nation of the dominant class, the Mexico characterized by corruption, political bosses, political assassinations and repression, the "Mexico of the powerful"; on the other, "the Mexico of the Mexicans", "the project for the nation that means its reconstruction, justice and life, peace in all things and for all ... the Mexico of its citizens" (EZLN 1997:385).

Even towards the end of the period examined here, when the EZLN had turned to anticapitalism as its dominant theme, the effects of neoliberal globalization and US neocolonialism are described in nationalist terms as the destruction of "the Mexican nation" or of "our motherland" (Subcomandante Marcos 2006), and the anticapitalism professed is repeatedly presented as a "left-wing anticapitalist national movement" (Castellanos 2008:117). It is thus not merely to maintain a well-publicized brand name that the EZLN, the Zapatist National Liberation Army, continues to call itself by this name.

3.2. Democracy

What other guerrilla has called for a democratic, civic, peaceful national movement to make resource to armed conflict useless?

What other guerrilla asks its supporters what
Another strand of the EZLN discourse has always been a call for democracy, at least since 1994; for just as neoliberalism is blamed for the denationalization of Mexico's wealth, "collusion between power and money" - between political and financial powers - is held responsible for leaching the State of democratic content. A demand for democracy, along with justice and freedom, has been a rallying cry from DLJ1 to DLJ6, and the EZLN's declared central aims have constantly included a "transition to democracy" as the necessary sequels to the desired elimination of "the 70-year dictatorship", "the militarization of the State", and a "one-party" system rife with political bosses, corruption, endemic electoral fraud and political assassination. This transition is to involve a "reform of electoral law", and is envisaged as emanating from a constitutional process in an authentic National Democratic Convention.

The general concept of democracy entertained by Marcos is quite classical, government by the majority with respect for minorities(Subcomandante Marcos 1998). However, at an operational level the distinction between classical representative democracy and participative or direct democracy comes to be decisive. Although representation and participation are not initially seen as incompatible (what is called for is genuine representation backed by massive participation), the 2001 failure of the Mexican Congress to enact an Indian rights law in keeping with the spirit of the COCOPA recommendations is followed by a shift in the EZLN position; "bourgeois" representative democracy is now denounced as essentially rotten and hollow, and direct, non-electoral participation as the only kind of democratic system worthy of the name.

Direct democracy was always, of course, the form favoured by the EZLN, which never took part in elections or promoted a political wing with that aim, preferring instead to carry out processes of consultation with its grass roots supporters prior to each major decision. Nevertheless, for many years it respected Mexican electoral processes in the hope that its influence on voters would be translated into favourable behaviour by their elected representatives. It was only following the events of 2001 and its ensuing 20-month silence that the EZLN openly proclaimed the inherent futility of national elections dominated by neoliberal political parties that had always and would always turn their backs on the Mexican poor in general and indigenous peoples in particular. All national political parties,
including the PRD and the PT, were now viewed as irremediably vitiated and subservient to neoliberal economics: no longer are there either right-wing, or left-wing, or centre parties, because neoliberal globalization has made Mexican democracy corrupt to the core. The "electoral fraud" of 2006 is seen simply as the confirmation of the inherent vulnerability of representative democracy to corruption.

It is perhaps to avoid confusion between the two kinds of democracy that since about 2004 the term has virtually been used only to denounce "the idiocies of modern democracy", that is, of bourgeois representative democracy (Subcomandante Marcos 2006, Part 3). References to direct (authentic) democracy have generally been replaced by references to "another kind of politics". But this reluctance to employ the term other than in the oft-invoked triad "democracy, freedom and justice" may also reflect the difficulties encountered by the EZLN in its efforts to coordinate a cluster of diverse groups through networks of consultation and decision, and the growing divorce between, on the one hand, the "colloquial discourse" (Leyva Solano 1996) of Indian associations that were plural in their organization, objectives and methods, and, on the other, the "official" discourse of an EZLN that, possibly in response to these difficulties, was becoming increasingly vanguardist and sectarian (EZLN = "men of true word") in its frontal collision with the Mexican State.

3.3. Anti-globalization and anti-neoliberalism

Yes, you lot think that "neoliberalism" is a capitalist doctrine designed to tackle the economic crises that capitalism attributes to "populism" ... Well, "neoliberalism" is not a theory with which to tackle or explain the crisis. It is the crisis itself, converted in economic theory and doctrine! ... it is not even minimally coherent, it has no plans or historical perspective. In short, pure theoretical bullshit.

Durito II (Neoliberalism viewed from the Lacandon)

"Globalization" and "neoliberalism" are synonymous in EZLN discourse for what has always constituted one of the main enemies against which the EZLN has fought. In a 1999 interview, Marcos stated that "It is neoliberalism that, since it began to prevail in all its ugliness in 1982, has forced Indians to revolt. It is not Zapatism that has led them to it: either they fight and survive, or disappear, or die. That is what gave rise to the first Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, what gave birth to the Zapatist uprising ... among an indigenous population that
contemplates with critical eye this model of a society of waste and pretence, powered by the depredation of natural resources and the sale of the country's economic apparatus to the multinationals" (Vázquez Montalbán 1999:146). However, EZLN declarations and communiqués prior to DLJ3 (January 1995) present only a political analysis of the causes of the uprising (the "one-party" system, the "70-year dictatorship"); it is not until DLJ3 that neoliberalism irrupts explicitly in the discourse: "In the year that has just ended, the brutal system that dominates us has finally shown its true face. The political, economic, social and repressive programme of neoliberalism has shown its inefficacy, its falsehood, and its essential cruel injustice. Neoliberalism, as doctrine and reality, must without delay be thrown on the midden of our nation's history".

A year later, in the First Declaration from La Realidad (Against neoliberalism and for humanity), globalization and neoliberalism are equated as amounting to "a new world war waged on all humankind"; and in August 1996, at the First Intercontinental Gathering for Humanity and against Neoliberalism - held to set up an "alternative intercontinental communications network" - the antiglobalization Second Declaration from La Realidad rails against "neoliberalism as a system of the world". Many authors still see the EZLN as a prolongation of the focalist Latin American guerrilla movements of the 1960s. However, for most of the period examined here its anti-neoliberal pronouncements were devoid of Marxist vocabulary. As I have already noted, the terms "revolution" and "revolutionary" were almost from the beginning replaced by "rebellion" and "rebel"; Leninist vanguardism was avoided; the proletariat was not included among the declared targets of its communiqués; and socialist or communist tradition in regard to organization, lexicon and the structure of the State was ignored: "What other guerrilla, instead of calling on the proletariat as the vanguard of history, has called upon a civil society fighting for democracy?" (EZLN 1995:242). Neoliberalism is thus criticized from the perspective afforded by the defence of participative, deliberative democracy ("all voices count", "we have come to listen to them", "we are you"), in explicit avoidance of the militarist hierarchies of the Latin American Marxist left. And although it is accordingly all the more striking that Marxist vocabulary surfaces in the economist diagnosis expounded in DLJ6 (2005), at no time is any socialist alternative to capitalism proposed. Rather, it is a hazy postmodern situation that is hinted at: "we propose no specific economic model"; "Zapatism is not a new political ideology or a rehash of old ideologies. Zapatism does not exist ...
There are no recipes, guidelines, strategies, tactics, laws, rules or watchwords" (EZLN 1996:258).

Like the Indianist strand of EZLN discourse, the anti-neoliberal strand has its literary side, the tales of the intellectual beetle Durito. As stand-alone texts or embedded in EZLN communiqués, these stories began to appear in April 1994, when Durito is discovered smoking a pipe and studying "neoliberalism and its strategy for the domination of Latin America"; many were later published as a collection (Subcomandante Marcos 1999). It is noteworthy that Durito's criticisms of neoliberalism take forms that parody, and thus simultaneously criticize, a whole constellation of left-wing myths and traditions (revolution, vanguard, classical guerrilla movements, charismatic leaders, etc.), including the EZLN itself (Vanden Berghe 2005).

3.4. Indianism

*We Mexican Indians; we the forgotten; we the humiliated; we the deceived; we the ill-treated; we the dead; we the rebels; we the honourable; we the true; do not surrender.*

*Declaration on the 502nd anniversary of the discovery of America*

The fourth strand of the EZLN's discourse, the strand that predominated throughout the period 1995-2002, is Indianism, understood as non-ethnicist political Indianism in the sense described above: an identity strategy that, in contrast to identities determined by class (peasant), nationality (citizen of the mixed-blood Mexican nation State) or religion (protestant, Catholic), appeals to the economic, political and cultural heritage of Mexican indigenous communities as ethnic groups with a collective identity. This endeavour involves firstly, the uniting of the diverse ethnolinguistic communities of Chiapas within this collective identity, its acceptance by them as a motive of self-esteem; secondly, its recognition by the Mexican State; and thirdly, its use to claim for itself a series of political, cultural and economic attributes, including, most prominently, its autonomy. It is here that the EZLN's Indianism meshes with its nationalism, since the indigenous peoples, the "men and women of corn", are collectively presented as the authentic Mexico, the Indian heart of the motherland.

Certain Indianist themes had indeed been touched on even in Marcos' pre-1994 writings, such as the important 1992 essay *Chiapas: the southeast in two winds, a storm and a prophecy* (EZLN 1994:49 et seq.). But it was not part of the ideology with which he arrived in the jungle. His neozapatism became Indianist when he became familiar not only with an
indigenous reality ill-fitted by Marxist-Leninist class struggle theory, but also with well-established indigenous movements and organizations (De Vos 2002; Van der Haar 2002; Ruiz and Burguete 2003; Mattiace 2003; Velasco 2003; Higgins 2004; De la Fuente 2006). Crucial in this regard were Tojolabal autonomy, the movement against the celebrations commemorating the fifth centenary of the discovery of America (Quinientos Años de Resistencia), claims under ILO Convention 169 concerning indigenous and tribal peoples, and the autonomy of the Miskitos in Nicaragua. As Marcos himself has repeatedly stressed, contact with indigenous communities between 1983 and 1994 gave rise to a radical transformation of an initially Marxist-Leninist organization and its programme. The "somewhat blinkered" vocabulary of "socialism, revolution, and the dictatorship of the proletariat" gave way to language speaking of democracy, human beings, and humanity, and the idea of an army acting as the vanguard of the revolution was replaced by that of an army composed of indigenous communities (Vázquez Montalbán 1999:133; Le Bot 1997:130,201; Baschet 2002:160. Although the distinction between peasant and Indian was still formally present in DLJ1 and DLJ2, which present a fundamentally class-based analysis, and the list of demands presented at the end of the first peace talks in 1994 likewise distinguished between peasant and Indian ("The intolerable injustice and violation of our human rights as Indians and impoverished peasants"; EZLN 1994:179), even the EZLN of 1994 nevertheless diverged markedly from traditional guerrilla movements in its non-Marxist language, its strategy (immediate cessation of armed conflict), its demands (political and cultural rights) and its projected organization (broad, multicentric non-vanguard fronts), not to mention its "Indianization" of Zapata's legend through its incorporation into Indian myth in the figure of Votán-Zapata. This is not to say that the strategy and organization of the EZLN precisely matched its discourse; one does not have to share the "brilliant imposture" thesis (De la Grange and Rico 1998) to see that its military structure and Marcos' highly personal leadership clashed no little with the round assertions of its discourse (e.g. references to "governing in obedience"), which were indeed subject to strict hierarchic control (De Vos 2002).

The Indianization of EZLN discourse emerges fully fledged in DLJ3, in which the Indian question assumes a central role. The fundamental problem faced by the EZLN is no longer the effects of the "one-party" dictatorship of the PRI, but the "long night of 500 years", the "grave living conditions of indigenous Mexicans", the massacres and genocide of Mexican Indians; and its demands are the recognition of Indian rights and autonomy in a reformed
Constitution for a multiethnic, multicultural nation that satisfactorily accommodates its indigenous peoples: "Votán-Zapata did not die .... Today, Votán-Zapata fights on, in the progress of the EZLN, for Democracy, Freedom and Justice" (Subcomandante Marcos 1998). Nevertheless, as has already been pointed out, the Indianism expressed in DLJs 3, 4 and 5, and in the texts generated during the March of the Colour of the Earth, is not of the ethnofundamentalist kind. Indianism is reconciled with Mexican nationalism, the indigenous peoples being regarded, not as "Indian nations" accidentally lying within the Mexican frontiers, but as "peoples" or "communities" that form an organic part of the Mexican nation - in fact, its heart. Indian and Mexican identities are thus presented, not as mutually exclusive, but as superimposable and superimposed ("We Mexican Indians ...", "We ... continue to be Mexicans ..."; EZLN 1995:102 and 284); and the constitution of "autonomous" EZLN communities is not a form of separatism, with calls for self-determination and sovereignty, but a mode of self-governance aimed at the effective inclusion of the Indian peoples in "the great Mexican nation", which is thereby reshaped and reinforced as a multicultural "motherland of all the peoples" - in contrast to the racist "invisibility" of the Indian in the "cosmic race", the "the crucible of races" postulated by the traditional theory of the Mexican State. EZLN discourse shows not a trace of withdrawal into ethnofundamentalism.

The result of this attitude is a strategy that, to borrow Marcos' own words from another context, may be regarded as a peculiar kind of "critical and liberating hybrid" (Vázquez Montalbán 1999) that stems from the pluriethnic reality of Chiapas: "Our hopeful march is not directed against the mixed-blood, but against the race of money" (EZLN 1995:102). It is this strategy that gives birth to the "pluriethnic autonomies" (Burguete 2001; Mattiace 2003), experiments in self-governance that avoid identifying the autonomous territory with any specific ethnic group. Although this open, universalizing Indianism is occasionally interrupted in the Relatos de El Viejo Antonio (Subcomandante Marcos 1998) by more communitarian features (El Viejo Antonio is himself an incarnation of the Indian people, and the vehicle of an implicit claim of the moral superiority of the Indian over the mixed-blood; Vanden Berghe 2005:116-119), these passages seem nonetheless to be aimed at the achievement of a difficult synthesis of political and cultural factors in the establishment of the foundations of the movement.

To sum up, the salient aspects of an analysis of EZLN Indianism, understood as a politico-military movement demanding autonomy for certain territories, are twofold: 1) it is embedded in a complex ideological matrix together with other components (Fig.1), by the changing relative
weights of which it is influenced; and 2) it is political, not ethnofundamentalist - its politics does not seek to give expression to a pre-extant indigenous identity that has supposedly remained essentially immutable since the birth of time, but to a de-racialized identity with continuously evolving cultural traits and needs ("I asked him how he had found the way. 'I didn't', replied Old Antonio. 'It wasn't there. I didn't find it, I made it'; EZLN 1997:300). In particular, the evolution of Indian identity involves its dealing with and incorporating modern features that respond, for example, to urban life, the post-1989 international context, neoliberalism, ecological concerns, or - of fundamental importance in EZLN communities - the changing role of women. This on-going process of evolution amounts to a concept of Indianity that escapes from the model of a closed, hierarchical, authoritarian, gerontocratic, patriarchal society, creating in its place a supralocal indigenous community. It is this notion that is incarnated linguistically in Marcos' literary fusion of Mexicanisms, Indianisms and contemporary concepts: "[Old Antonio] is the tool that Marcos avails himself of to communicate the Indian world with the urban world. It is Old Antonio who provides the Indian traits of Zapatist language when it speaks to the outside world. I'm a plagiarist" (Marcos, in Le Bot 1997:65).

Organizationally, supralocal Indianism seeks realization as a multicentric front, spreading from the FZLN, that correlates the Indian question with national liberation and the other strands of EZLN discourse. Between 1995 and the March of the Colour of the Earth in 2001, this great network, extending to national and international civil society, allowed both the maintenance of Indian demands for territorial autonomy and cultural recognition that would go beyond the scope of "use and custom"; and the prospect of alliances with non-Indianist groups in proposed forums such as the National Democratic Convention. However, as we have already seen, the Indianist strand lost weight in EZLN discourse as a result of its leftist turn in 2005. Following this date, the indigenous peoples were no longer treated as central protagonists, but on an equal footing with others - and even this level of importance was reserved only for Indian groups qualifying as mobilized for an anti-capitalist national uprising of the downtrodden according to the EZLN's demanding criterion (i.e. not merely reformist, but radically anti-establishment).

4. Conclusions

The discourse of the EZLN has not been ever that of a "pure", monothematic Indianist movement. Most of the time has had an essentially complex political nature realized in the strategic articulation of four ideological strands - nationalism, anti-neoliberalism, democracy and Indianism - that in spite of important variations in their relative
weights have always been correlated in a complex whole. Between 1994 and 2008, the variations in emphasis have created three major periods in EZLN history: first, a fleeting period of armed rebellion that, though quickly abandoned, not only exhibited the EZLN's lasting antagonism of the established order, but also left a significant legacy in that the EZLN has never surrendered its arms; second, between 1995 and 2004, a period characterized by the fusion of non-ethnofundamentalist Indianism and Mexican nationalism; and lastly, since 2005, a turn towards radical left-wing anticapitalism.

The short first stage, though not so overtly Indianist as the second, was not the a mere prolongation of the focalism of the classical Marxist-Leninist Latin American guerrilla movement, as has sometimes been stated. Rather, it was a complex admixture of diverse ideas and principles emerging from the disintegration of a focalist perspective.

As stressed above, the Indianist second stage was not ethnofundamentalist, but a political synthesis of indigenous viewpoints with Mexican nationalism, demands for effective democracy (in particular, for the disappearance of the PRI and the one-party system in general), and anti-neoliberalism - this last strand facilitating support from other movements in Mexico and abroad. However, the fact that the EZLN's demands for effective democracy were not accompanied by its relinquishing its military structure and becoming a purely political movement eventually proved to constitute its Achilles' heel, a source of constant contradiction and of friction with more reformist Indian organizations, with which it eventually parted company. The EZLN's third stage started with DLJ6. This declaration, and its prolongation in the Other Campaign, did not constitute a minor variation of the EZLN discourse, but an abrupt change in its priorities. The recovery of Marxist language, the rejection of bourgeois democracy and the redefinition of the EZLN as an anticapitalist left-wing movement all reflect, in the first place, the manifest relegation of the Indian cause from the forefront of the EZLN's programme and structure, the former demands for Indian rights, autonomy and cultural and political recognition becoming diluted within an antiliberal strategy that seeks to unite the multiple demands of a wider range of groups; and secondly, the EZLN's self-exclusion from the practice of democratic politics. The EZLN's desperate attempt to be adopted as a natural leader by a wider audience backfired, resulting in its progressive isolation not only from the main Mexican political parties, but a increasing distance from its chief former sources of political support - Indian organizations, Mexican and foreign intellectuals and academics, the press, and civil society in general - especially after it refused to be part of the wave of support for López Obrador following the 2006 elections.
In view of the developments of the EZLN's third stage, it may reasonably be wondered whether its Indianism, its switch "from class to culture" (Hetcher 2002), was not always a mere tactic, designed to incorporate the Indian communities' demands in a context that was favourable both nationally (with a weakened PRI) and internationally (following the fall of the Berlin Wall). The fading of political opportunities with the failure of the COCOPA and the increasing military pressure in Chiapas, together with the EZLN's own limitations (its military structure and vanguardist, radically anti-establishment strategy), seem finally to have led it to sacrifice the cause of Indian rights. And, given its progressively shrinking influence, the unnegotiability of its leftist anti-establishment demands and the virtual absence of all prospects of forming alliances with Indian organizations and significant political parties, the question arises whether it is not increasingly likely to return to its initial strategy of armed rebellion. At the Colloquium organized in December 2007 in memory of André Aubry, Marcos announced that "The signs of war on the horizon are clear. War, like fear, has its smell, and its fetid stench is now beginning to be inhaled in our lands ..."; and in Siete vientos en los calendarios y geografías de abajo (Subcomandante Marcos 2009:4), "In war they learnt of us, in war we have remained these 15 years, in war we shall continue until this corner of the world called Mexico takes up its own destiny."

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Figure 1. THE STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS OF EZLN DISCOURSE

- NATIONALISM
- DEMOCRACY
- INDIANISM
- ANTI-NEOLIBERALISM
- ANTI-GLOBALIZATION

EZLN
**PROBLEM**

Betrayal of the motherland
"To live for the motherland or die for freedom"
Oppression
“Everything is taken from us”

**DIAGNOSIS:**

CAUSES
- The one-party system
- The 70-year dictatorship
- Political corruption
- Electoral fraud
- Political assassinations
- Militarism
- Presidentialism

**ANTAGONISTS**
- Motherland-sellers
- The Salinas government
- The Mexican Federal Army
- Political fossils
- Political bosses
- Thieves of hope

**DIAGNOSIS:**

CAUSES
- The one-party system
- The 70-year dictatorship
- Political corruption
- Electoral fraud
- Political assassinations
- Militarism
- Presidentialism

**ANTAGONISTS**
- Motherland-sellers
- The Salinas government
- The Mexican Federal Army
- Political fossils
- Political bosses
- Thieves of hope

**PROGNOSIS:**

ALTERNATIVES
- National liberation
- National sovereignty
- Nation and motherland
- A new Mexico
- Democracy, justice and freedom
- A more equitable Mexico
- Mexico's coming of age
- A new Mexican
- Transition to Democracy
- A new Constitution
- National Democratic Convention

**PROTONISTS**

1. EZLN rebels
   - Peasants and Indians
   - Men of corn
   - The faceless
   - The dispossessed, the poor

2. The Mexican people
   - A new kind of politician
   - Historical precursors:
     - Heirs of the founders of the nation
     - Independence: Hidalgo, Morelos, Guerrero
     - Revolution: Villa, Zapata

**REPERTORY of ACTION**

Hope (I) with a trigger:
- Declaration of war
- Tricolour flag [?????]
- Red and black uniform
- Siege of cities

Hope (II) of the great mass mobilizations:
- A new kind of political party
- Free democratic elections
- Direct, participative democracy
- National civil society
- Self-organization

Breaks with the language of focalism:
- Non-Marxista (reference to revolution suppressed)
- Democracy, justice, human beings
  "Rebels"
PROBLEM
The dignity of the Indian
The long night of 500 years
Grave living conditions of Mexican Indians
Misery, repression, cultural impoverishment
Genocide, ethnocide

DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSES
Nation:
Moribund nation
Sell-off of national wealth
DeSTRUCTION of the nation
Negation of national history

State:
The party of the State
Electoral fraud and political corruption
Neoliberalism: collusion of Government and Wealth

Indigenous communities:
Absence of cultural, legal or political recognition
(stylized by the ideology of the "cosmic race")
Repression, genocidal war

DIAGNOSIS:
ANTAGONISTS
PRI (Zedillo, Salinas)
Neoliberalism
Internationale of terror
Neoconquistadors
Racists

PROGNOSIS:
ALTERNATIVES
Nation:
A motherland with room for all its peoples, all its tongues
Incorporation of the indigenous peoples in the nation
A great new Mexican nation

National struggle, national dialogue
A new custody of the motherland

State:
Abolition of the one-party system
Transition to democracy
Free and fair elections
A new Constitution
National Democratic Convention

Communities:
Recovery of Indian pride and dignity
Indian rights
De jure autonomy
National Indian Law (the COCOPA proposal)
Constitutional recognition of the Indian peoples
De facto autonomy
Boards of Good Governance

PROGNOSIS:
PROTAGONISTS
EZLN
We the indigenous peoples (linguistic identification)
The original inhabitants of these lands, "men of corn"
Root of the nation
Indian heart of the motherland
Proud indigenous essence of the Mexican nation
National Indian Congress

REPERTORY of ACTION
The word (and silence) as weapon
Pacific mobilization: rebellious dignity
A new kind of political organization
Non-vanguardist
... not a party
... with no participation in elections
Broad front
1. Multicentric, multi-organizational
2. Zapatist: indigenous
3. National liberation (geographical location in the mountains of the Mexican southeast)

Legendary places (Aguascalientes)
EZLN non-vanguardist (hegemony), representation (translation)
A great network:
National civil society (Mexican brothers)
International civil society (not ethnofundamentalist movements)
Internationale of hope

Rhetorical resources:
Dichotomies: night vs. day, face vs. faceless, voice vs. silence, mountain vs. valley,
linear vs. circular time
Hybrid language (Mexicanisms, Indianisms)
Metaphor/metonymy: Behind us we are you

Literaturization of communiqués, narrative fiction:
Tales of El Viejo Antonio: traditionalism, orality, nativism, religion, Indianism
Tales of Durito: neoliberalism, postmodernism (irony, pastiche)

Figure 3 EZLN FRAME II POLITICAL INDIANISMO (1995 – 2004)
Figure 4. EZLN IDENTITY STRATEGIES

PEASANT
- Spanish Language
- Class
- Law
- Land
- History
- Linear Time
- Centralism
- Back-scratching
- Individual Rights

INDIAN
- Native Tongue
- Ethnic Group
- Custom
- Territory
- Myth
- Circular Time
- Autonomy
- Ethnic Mobilization
- Collective Rights

THE EXPLOITED
- Exploitation
- Anti-capitalism
- Leftism
- Anti-establishment
- Another Kind of Politics
- Direct Democracy

Exclusion
- Poverty
- Oppression
- Work
- Neoliberalism
Figure 5 EZLN FRAME III  ANTICAPITALIST LEFTISM (2004 - …)

PROBLEM

Capitalist barbarity
Economic model,
Relations of production,
Exploitation
“The great theft”, “sale of the motherland”, “destruction of the Mexican nation”, “the war waged by the capitalist system”
Domination
Deregulation
Repression of the discontent of the masses

DIAGNOSIS:

CAUSES
The capitalist system
Neoliberal globalization
Representative democracy, bourgeoisie democracy
Corruption of all political parties
Treason of the political classes
Neoliberal macroeconomic policies
Left, right and centre no longer exist
Nation of dumb mutes

DIAGNOSIS:

ANTAGONISTS
Neoliberalism
USA
Politicians in general
Electoral politicians (idle parasites)
All political parties
López Obrador (= Salinas)
National Democratic Convention
Left-wing Latin American governments (Lula, Tabaré, Morales…)

PROGNOSIS:

ALTERNATIVES
To go beyond the Indian question
“below and to the left” (vs. “up above to the right”)
Anti-capitalist left
Alternative national project, national campaign
Definitive split with the Government
Break with all electoral political parties
A new Constitution

PROGNOSIS:

PROTAGONISTS
EZLN
We the exploited
Those who rebel against their exploitation
Mexican civil society (the anti-capitalist left)
International civil society (the anti-capitalist left)

REPERTORY of ACTION

Anti-establishment movement (autonomous sociopolitical movement)
Radical, frontal criticism
Nacional anti-capitalist movement
Another kind of politics: no parties, no elections
Direct democracy vs. representative democracy
Direct, without intermediaries
Assemblies
Dissolution of the FZLN
The Other Campaign, a national fight
Atavism: "the way left-wing militants used to"
Exclusion ("let them go")

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